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OBJECTIVITY IN LEGAL JUDGMENT 
Heidi Li Feldman* 
INTRODUCTION 
We are experiencing a crisis of confidence in the idea of objectivity. 
In scholarly circles, many are ready to discontinue talk of objectivity 
altogether, on the grounds that it has been nothing more than a mask 
for the oppressive practices of politically and economically privileged 
groups, promising neutrality where in fact there are only power rela-
tions. Some feminist legal scholars, some critical race scholars, and 
some critical legal studies scholars, along with some contemporary 
philosophers, argue that objectivity is inevitably a problematic, dan-
gerous idea or ideal. Critics of objectivity sometimes argue that it can 
never be genuinely had, only claimed under false pretenses and then 
used oppressively.1 
On the strongest reading of their ideas, critics of objectivity insist 
that we entirely eliminate the idea of objectivity from our conceptual 
vocabulary. Different commentators base their insistence on different 
grounds. Feminist critics reject objectivity because, in their view, it is 
inextricably connected to male power and female subordination; purg-
ing objectivity from our conceptual vocabulary is prerequisite to the 
elimination of these evils. 2 Some philosophers claim that objectivity 
is, at best, chimerical, and that, at worst, it limits our capacity to im-
agine and create new and better moral and political lives for ourselves. 
According to these critics, abandoning objectivity would save us from 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1986, Brown; J.D. 1990, Ph.D. 
(Philosophy) 1993, Michigan.-Ecl. I would like to express my warmest, deepest thanks to the 
many colleagues in the University of Michigan Law School and Department of Philosophy who 
read drafts of this work for their generosity in commenting upon and discussing it throughout 
the stages of its development. 
1. Commentators critical of objectivity include the feminist legal scholar Catharine Mac-
Kinnon, the critical race scholar Richard Delgado, and the philosopher Richard Rorty. See 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 120-24 (1989); 
RICHARD RORTY, Solidarity or Objectivity, in OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 21 
(1991); Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARYL. REV. 
741, 762-68 (1993). For a composite overview of feminist objections to objectivity, see SANDRA 
HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE?: THINKING FROM WOMEN'S LIVES 157-
59 (1991). Objectivity is controversial in fields other than law and philosophy. For a discussion 
of critics of objectivity as a journalistic ideal and a rebuttal of these criticisms, see Judith Lichten-
berg, In Defense of Objectivity, in MASS MEDIA AND SOCIETY 216 (James Curran & Michael 
Gurevitch eds., 1991). 
2. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 120-25. 
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both epistemological and ethical error. 3 
Other critics of objectivity condemn it less strenuously. They re-
gard the idea of objectivity as dispensable, if not dangerous. Accord-
ing to some such critics, talk of objectivity tends to inhibit our 
thinking, curtailing arguments that ought to continue.4 According to 
others, talk of objectivity makes us feel more constrained than we re-
ally are. 5 In either case, the idea of objectivity offers little in the way 
of positive power, according to these critics, and so relinquishing it 
imposes little cost. 
Skepticism and cynicism about objectivity, especially objectivity in 
law, is not restricted to scholars. We find it among the general public, 
surfacing in reaction to controversial trial judgments, such as those 
reached in the Rodney King and Reginald Denny beatings trials, and 
in response to Supreme Court judgments on sensitive matters, such as 
abortion and voting rights. Contentious legal judgments invite doubt 
about the law's capacity for objectivity. 
I take seriously concerns about the potential dangers of the idea or 
the ideal of objectivity and worries about whether objectivity is illu-
sory. But objectivity is a very powerful idea, one that we could, per-
haps, put to good use in criticizing what merits criticism and praising 
what merits praise. Before we abandon the idea or ideal of objectivity 
altogether, we should see whether we can elucidate it in a way that 
answers to that which seems worthwhile in the concept without in-
cluding that which seems pernicious. This elucidation will enable us 
to gain a clear picture of the costs and benefits of retaining the idea 
and the ideal. Then, but only then, we will be ready to consider when, 
if ever, objectivity is' a concept worth keeping in currency. 
Popular understanding of science has given us one very simple 
conception of objectivity. According to this rather vague, prereflective 
conception, objectivity is a matter of correspondence to the world as it 
"really" is, independent of our practices, goals, values, and beliefs. 
Objective judgments track this human-independent world. For those 
seeking objectivity in legal judgment, a problem emerges immediately 
upon consideration of this simple conception. The phenomena identi-
fied by legal concepts such as negligence, fraud, and rape are not like 
the phenomena identified by natural scientific concepts like proton or 
3. See, e.g., RoRTY, supra note 1, at 27-28, 33-34. 
4. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 80-83 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, EM-
PIRE]; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 171-74 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, 
PRINCIPLE). 
5. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Plzenome· 
nology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 520-21 (1986). 
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gravity. Negligence, fraud, and rape are not human-independent phe-
nomena; they are constituted by our practices, goals, values, and be-
liefs. Legal judgments that apply concepts like negligence, fraud, and 
rape are not purely descriptive. 6 These legal judgments do not aspire 
to correspond to a human-independent world, free from our practices, 
goals, values, and beliefs. If we have only the simple correspondence 
conception of objectivity available to us, it would seem that we have to 
surrender the possibility of objectivity in legal judgment. Many legal 
judgments do not fit into this conception of objectivity at all. 7 
Nor would most legal judgments fit into a conception of objectivity 
suitable for wholly evaluative or purely normative judgments, judg-
ments that apply concepts with little or no descriptive content. An 
example of a more purely evaluative concept is good; an example of a 
more purely normative concept is ought. These concepts apply appro-
priately under an extremely wide variety of factual circumstance, serv-
ing as all-purpose evaluative or prescriptive devices. Even though 
fraud and negligence have a negative evaluative flavor or component, 
it would be extremely odd to call torture fraud or negligence, whereas 
it would not be odd to call it bad. This is true because it will practi-
cally always be inappropriate, due to the descriptive dimensions of 
fraud and negligence, to apply these concepts to torture, even though 
it is practically always appropriate to evaluate torture negatively. 
Moreover, fraud and negligence do not negatively evaluate torture in 
an apt way. Due to the intricate interweaving of the descriptive and 
the evaluative dimensions of these concepts, they evaluate in distinc-
tive and particular ways. 8 Bad, on the other hand, aptly negatively 
evaluates circumstances ranging from torture to spitting on a public 
bus. That is because its evaluative dimension is more general and less 
nuanced than the evaluative dimensions of negligence or fraud. 
We do not have a straightforward prerefl.ective conception of ob-
jectivity for more purely evaluative and more purely normative judg-
ments, as we do in the case of more purely descriptive judgments. But, 
because more purely evaluative and more purely normative judgments 
are less closely world-guided than the kinds of legal judgments I have 
been noting, it is prima facie unlikely that a conception of objectivity 
suitable for more purely evaluative or normative judgments would be 
6. Throughout this essay, I speak of "applying" concepts. Note that both the use and the 
nonuse of a concept count as "applications" - that is, a decision not to use a concept is as much 
an instance of applying it as is a decision to use it. 
7. Whether even scientific judgments fit into this conception is a separate question, which I 
pursue briefly in Part II of this essay. See infra text accompanying notes 49-53. 
8. I clarify and pursue the nature of the connection between the descriptive and evaluative in 
concepts likefraud and negligence in Part I. See infra text accompanying notes 14-41. 
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suitable for more closely world-guided judgments, including the legal 
judgments mentioned so far.9 
The situation confronting the defender of the idea or ideal of objec-
tivity in legal judgment worsens. If neither the correspondence con-
ception of objectivity nor a conception of objectivity suitable for 
purely evaluative or purely normative judgments is suitable for many 
legal judgments, what avenues remain along which to develop a suita-
ble conception of objectivity for them? 
I propose that we start by getting a better grip on the nature of the 
concepts that figure in so many legal judgments: concepts that seem to 
blend description and evaluation, which I will henceforth refer to as 
blend concepts. Not all blend concepts are legal concepts - consider 
loyalty, rude, funny, or brutality. 10 If we could develop a conception 
of objectivity suitable for blend judgments - that is, judgments that 
apply blend concepts - we would arrive at a conception of objectivity 
suitable for many legal judgments: all those that apply blend legal 
concepts. 
Twentieth century moral philosophers have devoted much energy 
and space to considering blend concepts. 11 Legal concepts do not fig-
ure in these discussions, despite the fact that legal scholars have no-
ticed that many of these concepts exhibit the traits that drew 
philosophers' attention in the first place. 12 Neither philosophers nor 
9. I pursue and defend this claim in Part II, where I consider carefully conceptions of objec-
tivity in moral and political judgment developed by, respectively, Jiirgen Habermas and John 
Rawls. See infra text accompanying notes 49-71. 
10. Whether all distinctively legal concepts are blend concepts is a harder question, but one 
that we can set aside for now. 
11. Bernard Williams's and David Wiggins's works particularly inform my subsequent dis-
cussion in this essay. See generally DAVID WIGGINS, A Sensible Subjectivism?, in NEEDS, 
VALUES, TRUTH 185 (1987); BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 
(1985). Elizabeth Anderson, Simon Blackbum, Allan Gibbard, John McDowell, and Charles 
Taylor have also discussed issues relating to blend concepts. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, 
VALUE IN ETHICS AND EcONOMICS 91-116 (1993); SIMON BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE 
WORD 148-63 (1984); Simon Blackbum, Through Thick and Thin, 66 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN 
SOCY. 285 (Supp. 1992); ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS 112-25 (1990); Allan 
Gibbard, Thick Concepts and Warrant for Feelings, 66 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SocY. 267 (Supp. 
1992); JOHN McDOWELL, PROJECTION AND TRUTH IN ETHICS (1988); John McDowell, Ethics 
and the Limits of Philosophy, 95 MIND 377 (1986) (book review) [hereinafter McDowell, Ethics]; 
John McDowell, Values and Secondary Qualities, in MORALITY AND OBJECTIVITY 110 (Ted 
Honderich ed., 1985) [hereinafter McDowell, Values]; CHARLES TAYLOR, Interpretation and the 
Sciences of Man, in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 15 (1985) [hereinafter TAYLOR, Interpretation]; 
CHARLES TAYLOR, What Is Human Agency?, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 15 (1985). Philippa 
Foot and R.M. Hare have debated the proper philosophical analysis of concepts with some of the 
traits that belong to blend concepts. See PHILIPPA FooT, Moral Arguments, in VIRTUES AND 
VICES 96 (1978) [hereinafter FOOT, Moral Arguments]; PHILIPPA FOOT, Moral Beliefs, in VIR· 
TUES AND VICES, supra, at 110; R.M. HARE, Descriptivism, in EssAYS ON THE MORAL CON· 
CEPTS 55 (1972). 
12. See DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 4, at 119-27; A.W.B. SIMPSON, The Analysis of 
Legal Concepts, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY 335 (1987); H.L.A. Hart, Definition 
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legal scholars have carefully delineated the distinctive characteristics 
of blend concepts. Philosophers have not seriously or extensively ad-
dressed the question of whether such concepts are capable of objective 
application. 13 In legal schol~ship, on the other hand, objectivity has 
been a major preoccupation, but the debates have not focused on the 
application of blend legal concepts. 
This essay unites the philosophical concern with blend concepts 
and the legal concern with objectivity. Comparing blend legal con-
cepts with other kinds of blend concepts develops our resources for 
ascertaining the distinctive characteristics of blend concepts. Cultivat-
ing a more refined understanding of blend concepts sharpens our in-
quiry into objectivity. In Part I of this essay, I explicate the distinctive 
characteristics of blend concepts, demonstrating that some representa-
tive legal concepts, drawn from tort law, possess these characteristics. 
In Part II, I develop a conception of objectivity suitable for blend 
judgments - the blend conception of objectivity - and use this con-
ception to evaluate some representative blend legal judgments, includ-
ing judgments of negligence, judgments of what is speech, and 
judgments of rape. Finally, in Part III, I situate my discussion of the 
objectivity of blend judgments in the context of legal scholarship re-
garding objectivity, using the blend conception of objectivity to diag-
nose some hidden problems in previous discussions of objectivity in 
law. 
I. UNDERSTANDING BLEND CONCEPTS 
A. Distinguishing Blend Concepts 
When discussing issues raised by blend concepts, philosophers 
and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REv. 37 (1954). Felix Cohen noticed blend concepts 
only to lavish skepticism upon them: 
In every field of Jaw we should find peculiar concepts which are not defined either in terms 
of empirical fact or in terms of ethics but which are used to answer empirical and ethical 
questions alike, and thus bar the way to intelligent investigation of social fact and social 
policy. Corporate entity, property rights, fair value and due process are such concepts. So too 
are title, contract, conspiracy, malice, proximate cause, and all the rest of the magic "solvil)g 
words" of traditional jurisprudence. 
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 
820 (1935). My discussion of blend concepts opposes this sort of skepticism, as will become 
apparent in the subsequent text. Cohen's remarks suggest a prescriptivist approach to such con-
cepts. For an explanation and critical evaluation of this approach, see infra note 36. 
13. Some philosophers have presented preliminary discussions of objectivity in application of 
ethical blend concepts, but these discussions have been impeded, in my view, by the absence of a 
careful delineation of blend concepts. See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, Objectivity and the Science/ 
Ethics Distinction, in REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE 163, 163-78 (1990); WIGGINS, supra note 
11; WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 132-55; McDowell, Ethics, supra note 11; Warren Quinn, 
Reflections on the Loss of Moral Knowledge: Williams on Objectivity, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 195 
(1987) (book review). 
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have considered concepts such as rude, courage, and gratitude. 14 
Legal scholars have explored blend concepts such as crime, ownership, 
and State. 15 In both philosophical and legal scholarship, commenta-
tors proffer these concepts as categorically different from concepts that 
do not blend description and evaluation, such as red, water, or pro-
ton. 16 Yet it can be difficult to formulate a principled, illuminating 
delineation that will include the former but exclude the latter. 
Philosophers' and legal scholars' efforts in this direction tend to be 
overinclusive, underinclusive, or both. Bernard Williams, for instance, 
discusses "thick concepts"; he considers a concept "thick" if its appli-
cation is "world-guided" and "action-guiding" by virtue of the way in 
which it is world-guided. 17 This designation picks out too many con-
cepts: all those whose application is guided by how the world is and 
thereby tend to guide action. Concepts like water and proton would 
seem to qualify. The application of water depends on the state of the 
world, and identifying that state of the world (by applying water) reg-
ularly guides people to drink; the application of proton depends on 
how the world is and at minimum guides the actions of those physi-
cists applying the concept in the first place. Yet water and proton are 
supposed to be categorically different from rude or negligent. 
At the same time, Williams's delineation includes too few con-
cepts. Williams focuses on action as the upshot of application. But 
consider, for example, negligence. A judgment that somebody's con-
duct has been negligent does not lead to action in any straightforward 
way. Even if we grant that finding liability counts as an action, judg-
14. Contemporary moral philosophers have, in the main, attended to blend concepts either to 
motivate or test their positions on epistemological, metaphysical, and semantic issues in the de· 
bate over value realism. My own inquiry into blend concepts focuses firmly on epistemology, 
specifically on the epistemological issue of whether these concepts can be applied objectively. 
Turning to these questions allows me to deemphasize matters such as how best to analyze the 
content of blend concepts or the nature of their ontological status. This means that officially I 
am agnostic when it comes to the dispute over whether the content of a blend concept is fact· 
stating, whether a blend concept merely expresses the speaker's attitudes or acceptance of a 
certain system of norms, or whether its content combines fact and value in a categorical way. 
15. Crime is one of the concepts Dworkin mentions when he discusses "dispositive con-
cepts." DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 4, at 119; see infra text accompanying note 23. Brian 
Simpson uses ownership as one example in his discussion of legal concepts that, when applied, 
dictate certain results. SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 353. Simpson notes that these concepts have 
several other distinctive traits. His list overlaps those that distinguish blend concepts from 
others. See infra text accompanying notes 27-41. State is one of Hart's examples in his identifi· 
cation and analysis of legal concepts that "do not have the straightforward connection with 
counterparts in the world of fact which most ordinary words have" - that is, legal concepts that 
are not purely descriptive. Hart, supra note 12, at 37-38. For a discussion of my rejection of 
Hart's analysis of these concepts, see infra note 36. 
16. See, e.g., FooT, Moral Arguments, supra note 11, at 101-06; HART, supra note 12, at 38-
39; SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 347-58; WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 129, 140-41. 
17. WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 129-30, 140-41. 
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ing conduct negligent does not even lead directly to such a finding; 
even when it does, the connection between that judgment and action 
can be tenuous. The defendant may refuse to pay damages, the plain-
tiff may not try to enforce the judgment, and others might not be de-
terred from acting the way the defendant had acted. A judgment of 
negligence is as compatible with inaction as with action, even if such 
judgments often do provoke action. 18 
Another contemporary philosopher, David Wiggins, discusses "an-
thropocentric concepts."19 He identifies these as concepts that refer to 
a property that cannot be characterized illuminatingly without refer-
ence to subjective responses that, in tum, cannot be characterized il-
luminatingly without reference to the property denoted by the 
concept.20 One of Wiggins's usual examples is the concept funny, 
which, he maintains, cannot be elucidated without reference to the 
characteristic subjective response of amusement that, in tum, cannot 
be elucidated without reference to what it is to be funny. 21 While 
Wiggins's delineation at least arguably rules out proton, it certainly 
does not rule out a concept like red or a psychological concept like 
schizophrenic. Both of these seem - at least as much as does Wig-
gins's usual example of funny - to refer to properties that cannot be 
characterized illuminatingly without reference to subjective responses 
that, in tum, cannot be characterized illuminatingly without reference 
to the property denoted by the concept.22 Now, we might rest easy 
with a delineation of blend concepts that included schizophrenic in the 
class - because one can plausibly argue that schizophrenic blends de-
scription and evaluation - but it seems pretty clear that we want a 
delineation that excludes red. 
Like a delineation of blend concepts modeled on thick concepts, a 
delineation modeled on anthropocentric concepts is underinclusive as 
well as overinclusive. Wiggins's quintessential anthropocentric con-
cept, funny, belongs to the <property-response> pair <funniness-
amusement >. Grant that funniness cannot be characterized il-
luminatingly without reference to amusement and vice versa. Never-
18. In articulating her own characterization of blend concepts, Elizabeth Anderson points 
out a variety of circumstances under which one might sincerely conclude that a blend concept 
applies but fail to experience any corresponding motivational tug. ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 
102-03. 
19. WIGGINS, supra note 11, at 194-99. 
20. Id. at 195. 
21. Id. 
22. McDowell explicitly recognizes this problem and acknowledges the distinction between 
concepts whose parameters are defined in part by "normal" responses and concepts whose pa-
rameters are defined in part by appropriate responses or responses one should have. McDowell, 
Values, supra note 11, at 118. 
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theless, not every concept that blends description and evaluation is a 
member of such a pair. Negligence, like other blend legal concepts, is 
not illuminatingly characterized with reference to a subjective, senti-
mental response on a par with amusement. 
Ronald Dworkin identifies "dispositive concepts" as legal concepts 
with the following characteristic: "If the concept holds in a particular 
situation, then judges have a duty, at least prima facie, to decide some 
legal claim one way; but if the concept does not hold, then judges have 
a duty, at least prima facie, to decide the same claim in the opposite 
way."23 His examples are valid contract, civil liability, and crime. 
Each of these "dispositive concepts" are blend concepts. They com-
bine description and evaluation, simultaneously identifying a state of 
affairs and evaluating it, thereby guiding a judge's decision.24 As I will 
argue below,25 all blend concepts provide reasons for action, belief, or 
feeling. Thus, the applicability of valid contract, civil liability, or crime 
provides a reason for a judge to decide in a particular way. It may be 
that in these instances the reason exists in the form of a duty - it is 
plausible to think that having a duty to act in a certain way is a reason 
to do so - but not all blend concepts impose duties, even if they pro-
vide reasons. Consider funny. That a movie is funny might well pro-
vide a reason to see it or a reason to laugh at it, but that a film is funny 
does not impose a duty to do either of these things. If Dworkin is 
correct that blend legal concepts, when applied, impose duties, then he 
has perhaps delineated a subset of blend concepts, whose members are 
reason-giving by virtue of being duty-imposing. But he has not pro-
vided the delineation we are seeking. 
To establish the blend concept category, we need a delineation that 
excludes red, chair, and proton and includes rude, funny, and negli-
gence. 26 We know that concepts such as negligence appear to blend 
description and evaluation and tend to guide action, belief, and feeling. 
Now we need to elucidate these traits further and see whether addi-
tional traits distinguish blend concepts from other kinds. 
B. The Traits of Blend Concepts 
A quick characterization of blend concepts: they apply only under 
23. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 4, at 119. 
24. The nature and origins of duties are complex matters: whether or not the guidance re· 
suits from a duty imposed by the applicability of these concepts is a question I will set aside here. 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
26. The status of schizophrenic is more complicated. Whether and how it falls into the blend· 
concept category are matters to which I return after developing a fuller account of the traits of 
blend-concepts. See infra text accompanying notes 40-41. 
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certain factual circumstances and, at the same time, they evaluate 
those circumstances; when they do apply, they tend to guide our ac-
tions, beliefs, and feelings. This characterization raises more questions 
than it answers. What is the connection between the descriptive and 
evaluative aspects of a blend concept, particularly as the blend relates 
to its applicability in specific situations? . Why do blend judgments 
tend to guide our actions, beliefs, and feelings? A delineation of the 
traits of blend concepts should answer these questions. In this section, 
I provide one. 
Blend concepts are members of evaluative taxonomies. Evaluative 
taxonomies categorize the world for us, just as scientific taxonomies 
do, but they afford us evaluative, rather than explanatory, power. 
They enable us to make distinctions of worth rather than distinctions 
of causal role. By taxonomizing worth, evaluative taxonomies create 
standards for making discriminations that enable us to respond to a 
wide array of complex human needs and interests. In turn, the ability 
to make certain discriminations entrenches - and sometimes gener-
ates - particular needs and interests. 
Rude belongs to the evaluative taxonomy of etiquette. Other blend 
concepts of etiquette, such as polite, gracious, and vulgar, mark addi-
tional categories in this taxonomy. Funny belongs to the evaluative 
taxonomy of humor. Other members include facetious, waggish, and 
slapstick Negligence belongs to the evaluative taxonomy of tort law, 
as do reasonable person under like circumstances, and unreasonable 
risk In each of these instances, categories of the specific evaluative 
taxonomy comprise a set of complex standards that we use to navigate 
the domains of etiquette, humor, and tort law. These concepts influ-
ence our attitudes and our behavior, affecting our actions and our re-
actions to the actions of others. 
Correct application of the concepts comprising an evaluative tax-
onomy turns, in part, on whether certain facts, marked out by the 
taxonomy, obtain.27 Most often, but not always, these facts will be 
social, not natural - that is, the facts that guide the application of the 
concept will have to do with things like conventional mores, shared 
cultural ideas, community values, and customs. But correct applica-
tion of a blend concept, particularly in unforeseen and controversial 
cases, also turns on successfully ascertaining and interpreting the eval-
uative point(s) of the relevant taxonomy. A taxonomy's evaluative 
point - it may have more than one, but, for the sake of convenience, I 
27. When I speak of correctly, properly, or appropriately applying blend concepts, I mean 
applying them in ways that experienced users would find acceptable or appropriate based on their 
familiarity with prevailing norms of use. 
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will use the singular here - derives from the functions of the taxon-
omy. Evaluative taxonomies are responsive to particular human needs 
and interests. A taxonomy's evaluative point depends upon what it 
takes to satisfy these needs and interests. Correctly applying a blend 
concept requires sensitivity to the underlying human needs and inter-
ests addressed by the evaluative taxonomy to which the concept be-
longs and to the evaluative point the taxonomy has by virtue of the 
way it responds to these needs and interests. In run-of-the-mill appli-
cations of a blend concept, all this remains tacit. 
Sometimes, however, in the course of applying a blend concept, 
one confronts situations in which the facts cut both for and against 
application. In these situations, one must consciously decide whether 
to apply the concept. Further facts will not settle the matter. Instead, 
one must consult the evaluative point that informs the concept in 
question to decide whether this point would be better served by apply-
ing the concept or refusing to do so. This can be a complicated task, 
any conclusion of which is likely to be contestable. Consider, for ex-
ample, the matter of how to treat telephone solicitations. You are try-
ing to prepare dinner or get ready for work when the telephone rings. 
The person on the other end of the line asks for you by name, and, 
when you acknowledge your identity, he launches into the inexorable 
patter of a sales pitch. You want to interrupt him, to tell him you are 
not interested in whatever he is pitching, regardless of what it is, but 
you are held back by the powerful intuition that to do so would be 
rude. After the call, you realize you had better decide if the course of 
action you refrained from is in fact rude, so that next time you will be 
prepared to act on the impulse to cut off the salesperson, if indeed it 
would not be rude to do so. 
Here are some initial considerations relevant to your deliberations: 
Ordinarily, it is rude to interrupt people in the midst of their remarks, 
particularly when they are speaking in a way that indicates that they 
do not want to be interrupted. Interruption is least rude - perhaps 
not at all rude - when the conversation is casual; friends have more 
license than others in this respect. Delivering his seamless patter, the 
salesperson at the other end of the line makes it quite clear that he 
does not want to be interrupted. He is no friend of yours, either: he is 
a stranger, calling on business. In these respects, this situation seems 
like one in which interruption would be rude. But there are further 
considerations. There are circumstances in which interruption is ap-
propriate among those who are not friends: it can be appropriate for a 
superior to interrupt somebody she supervises; it can be appropriate 
for a person angry with another to interrupt; it can be appropriate for 
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anyone to interrupt a speaker when there is an emergency of which the 
speaker is not aware. Insofar as the salesperson is one who ought to 
defer to a customer, insofar as his call has angered you, insofar as you 
are in the midst of activities of which he is not aware, the telephone 
solicitation situation resembies ones in which it is permissible to 
interrupt. 
Different aspects of the situation weigh for and against deeming 
the proposed course of conduct rude. To settle the issue, you need to 
consult the evaluative point(s) of etiquette. To identify these, you need 
to think about the needs and interests that etiquette addresses. Ex-
perts in etiquette have a rich understanding of these needs and inter-
ests and of the ways in which etiquette satisfies them. Taking a rough 
stab, we might say that etiquette facilitates relationships between peo-
ple, thereby minimizing overt aggression and hostility while preserving 
maximal dignity and comfort for all.28 When considering whether in-
terrupting a phone solicitor is rude, one not only appropriately consid-
ers how the interruption affects this complex goal, but also how having 
phone solicitations as part of the social world affects it, as well as how 
deeming interruption rude will affect whether the social world will in-
clude phone solicitation. 
Here is another situation, drawn from tort law, in which facts 
alone do not decide a blend concept's applicability. Sally is a sixteen-
year-old delivery person for a local pizza parlor. She is mildly men-
tally retarded and attends a vocational school. The pizza parlor is 
located in a midsized city in the American northeast. On snowy eve-
nings there is great demand for pizza delivery. On such nights, the 
roads have usually not yet been plowed properly. Parked cars usually 
line the streets. One such evening, Sally is on a delivery run, bringing 
pizza to a house facing the street. Following her usual practice, which 
is common among delivery persons in her city, she double parks in 
front of the house, rather than trying to negotiate the snow-filled 
driveway. She leaves the key of her truck in the ignition, with the 
engine running, while she runs to the door with the pizza. On this 
occasion, however, some neighborhood teenagers have spotted Sally's 
arrival. Once she has made it up the walk of the house, one of the 
28. Even this very rough stab is likely to be quite contentious. Some would insist that eti-
quette has nothing to do with minimizing aggression and hostility or that it enables us to express 
these sentiments in relatively refined ways. Others would argue that conceiving of etiquette as a 
device for maximizing the comfort and dignity of all is a comparatively modern notion, imbuing 
etiquette with a more democratic caste than it has had traditionally. The difficulty of specifying 
the underlying needs and interests addressed by etiquette - or any such rich evaluative taxon-
omy - illustrates one source of the interpretive scope we have when applying its blend concepts. 
A specification of the needs and interests addressed by an evaluative taxonomy is an interpretive 
product, open to dispute. 
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teens, fourteen-year-old Alfred, hops into the truck and speeds away. 
Due to slippery road conditions, he makes it only half a block before 
the truck skids wildly, crashing into Edgar's parked car. The car is 
demolished. Alfred suffers severe injuries to both legs and his ribs. 
Both Edgar and Alfred sue the pizza parlor for which Sally works. 
In the absence of highly similar factual precedent, deciding 
whether to apply negligence - or whether to apply the subsidiary con-
cepts definitive of negligence, such as reasonable person and unreasona-
ble risk - requires one to consult the evaluative points of those 
concepts. Consider the range of evaluative points informing reason-
able person under like circumstances: allocation of blame, deterrence 
of unacceptable risktaking, and vindication of popular-moral intu-
itions about corrective justice and unacceptably dangerous behavior. 
Reasonable person responds to these evaluative points, within limits set 
by concern for judicial administrative efficiency.29 The decision about 
whether and how to apply the concept to Sally turns on how one's 
choice will or will not serve each of these points - points that, in any 
given case, may be in tension with one another. 30 When this is so, 
deciding application is that much trickier. Note that, particularly to 
the extent that one's choice serves the point of deterrence, it is appro-
priate to take into account whether one wants a world that allows 
sixteen-year-old, mildly retarded, novice drivers to deliver pizzas on 
snowy nights as quickly as they are able to do so by leaving their 
trucks parked on the street with the engine running. 
In choosing or refusing to extend a blend concept's applicability in 
situations like these, in which facts alone do not clearly settle the mat-
ter, not only does one consult the evaluative point(s) of the concept, 
one also makes a judgment about what shape the social world should 
take. Insofar as one's decision becomes entrenched in the use of the 
blend concept in question, one will have influenced behavior and atti-
29. This list compiles the evaluative points suggested by typical, run-of-the-mill negligence 
cases. See, e.g., Galindo v. TMT Transp., Inc., 733 P.2d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding a 
paranoid schizophrenic to the usual reasonable person standard on grounds of deterrence and 
fairness); Goldstein v. Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. 1974) (permitting an "extreme care" 
instruction on the grounds that it led to a proper assessment of fault without undermining deter-
rence goals); O'Leary v. Jacob Miller Co., 473 N.E.2d 200 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (requiring the 
trial court to include some reference to circumstances when instructing the jury in negligence 
standard so as to assess properly the defendant's fault); Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759 
(Mich. 1977) (finding that unreasonable risk is a matter of popular valuation); Meyers v. Robb, 
267 N.W.2d 450 (Mich. App. Ct. 1978) (noting that unreasonable risk is a matter of social 
value); Goss v. Allen, 360 A.2d 388 (N.J. 1976) (holding a seventeen-year old to a modified 
reasonable person standard on grounds of fairness and safety). 
30. Furthermore, we can debate whether negligence ought to respond to each of these evalua-
tive points. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81 (discussing controversies over what the 
evaluative points of negligence should be). 
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tudes accordingly. Moreover, this is, presumably, one of the things 
that bore on the decision to extend or not to extend the concept in the 
first place. The appropriateness of taking into account how one wants 
the social world to be when deciding whether or not a particular blend 
concept applies has no counterpart when it comes to applying con-
cepts such as proton or red. When deciding whether one can correctly 
apply proton to a particular set of facts, it is not appropriate to take 
into consideration how one wants the natural world to be. Nor is it 
appropriate to consider how one wants the world to be when deciding 
whether it would be correct to apply the concept red. But it is appro-
priate to acknowledge and take into account the way application is 
likely to influence the way things will go when deciding whether it 
would be correct to apply concepts like rude and negligence. 
The application of a blend concept influences the way things will 
go because blend concepts often affect behavior, sentiment, or both. 
Although I have already rejected action-guidingness and anthropocen-
tricity as marks of a blend concept, on grounds of both underinclusive-
ness and overinclusiveness, I do not deny connections between blend 
concepts and behavior and between blend concepts and sentiment. 
Yet these connections are not primary. They depend on the more fun-
damental connection between blend concepts and reasons.31 
We consult blend concepts when we are seeking reasons about 
what to do, think, value, or believe.32 For instance, suppose you are 
trying to decide whether to interrupt a phone solicitor. One way to 
make the decision is to decide whether to do so is rude. If you make 
the judgment that interrupting is rude, you will have formulated a rea-
son to refrain from interrupting. Or, suppose we are trying to decide 
whether to require Sally to compensate Edgar and Alfred. To do so, 
we will try to decide whether she was negligent. If we decide she was, 
we will have formulated a reason to require her to compensate. 
Reasons arise from our needs and interests. We have reason to do, 
think, feel, believe, and value whatever satisfies our genuine needs and 
interests; we take ourselves to have reason to do, think, feel, believe, 
and value whatever we sincerely believe will actually satisfy what we 
regard as our genuine needs and interests. The reason-givingness of 
blend concepts originates with their responsiveness to what we regard 
as - and often are - our genuine needs and interests. 33 It makes 
31. Williams does note that thick concepts are characteristically related to reasons for action, 
but he proceeds to concentrate on action as the distinctive product of their application. 
WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 140. 
32. It is, however, a further question whether the reasons blend concepts provide are good, 
bad, conclusive, superficial, or powerful. 
33. Here I set aside vexed issues such as the sources of genuine needs and interests and how 
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sense for us to be guided in our actions, feelings, and beliefs by appli-
cations of concepts that satisfy what seem to be our needs and further 
our apparent interests. 
Reason-givingness is reinforced by long-standing practices of us-
age. When a decision calls into play certain needs and interests, it 
then makes sense for people to figure out what to do by reference to 
the blend concept responsive to those needs and interests. Over time, 
people become so familiar with the concept and its typical applications 
that they do not necessarily go through the independent step of specifi-
cally identifying the underlying needs and interests; they simply decide 
whether or not the concept applies. In the background of the decision 
about interrupting the phone solicitor, for instance, is the interest in 
minimizing aggression and hostility while preserving maximal comfort 
and dignity for all. When wondering whether there is reason not to 
interrupt, one is, in a sense, wondering how best to serve this interest. 
Given that the concepts of etiquette respond to it, it makes sense to 
settle the question with reference to one of these concepts - that is, to 
figure out whether interrupting would be rude. In the long run, appli-
cation may well take on a life of its own: while the concept remains 
responsive to the initial underlying needs and interests, distinctive fact 
patterns call for its application, perhaps reshaping the body of needs 
and interests, or our understanding of those needs and interests, to 
which the concept responds. At this point, the connection between a 
blend concept and its underlying needs and interests becomes a two-
way street. 
In addition to telling a coherent, justificatory story about how peo-
ple have come to regard blend concepts as reason-giving, the needs-
and-interests account helps explain what is going on when a blend 
concept's reason-givingness gives way, either in a particular instance 
or across the board. Sometimes, despite a blend concept's usual rea-
son-givingness, it seems to exert little or no reason-giving force. Jasper 
tells Elmo that what he is doing is rude; Elmo says "Yes, indeed it is'' 
and goes right on doing it. Or, an American lawyer on holiday in a 
remote comer of the Amazon jungle says to his guide, "Lashing the 
cargo onto the raft that way is negligent,'' and the guide, agreeing, 
continues without a pause. The needs-and-interests account makes ex-
planatory space for making sense of Elmo's or the guide's behavior, 
without sacrificing the ability to make sense of the blend concepts' 
more typical reason-givingness. The needs-and-interests account al-
to distinguish genuine needs and interests from spurious ones. We need not settle these issues to 
develop a general understanding of how blend concepts provide reasons that seem genuine to 
those who use them. In other words, we are concerned withfelt reason-givingness. 
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lows us to demonstrate that the background conditions in these cases 
are such that the needs and interests that usually inform rude or negli-
gent are not present here, or that Elmo and the guide do not care 
about those needs and interests even if they are present. Furthermore, 
the needs-and-interests account gives Jasper and the lawyer the re-
sources to object that the usual needs. and interests do indeed obtain 
and to point them out, as well as the resources to criticize Elmo and 
the guide for failing to recognize or care about these needs and 
interests. 
Even though we can always return to discussing the needs and in-
terests that inform a blend concept, in many instances we will not need 
to nor will we do so. Applying the concept will be enough to supply a 
reason. This consequence of application is a distinctive trait of blend 
concepts. To see this, contrast the way in which a blend concept 
figures in a reason with the way in which a more purely descriptive 
concept, such as fire, figures in a reason. Although the fact that the 
building is on fire may well constitute a reason for leaving the build-
ing, we do not typically consult the concept.fire when making ordinary 
decisions about whether to leave the building. Suppose you have no 
reason to think the building you are in is on fire, and you are trying to 
decide whether to leave the building. Deciding whether the building is 
on fire would be a rather roundabout way to approach the question. 
Fire plays a much more contingent role in reasons than does negligent 
or rude: it figures in one's reasons if one already has reason to believe 
it applies, but, without this background factor in place, one does not 
consult fire as a starting point from which to make decisions about 
what to do, think, feel, or believe. This is not to say there is nothing 
contingent about the reason-givingness of blend concepts; even when 
needs and interests that undergird its reason-givingness are wide and 
enduring, these needs and interests may still be, at some level, contin-
gent. Nonetheless, the needs and interests that inform a blend con-
cept, and blend concepts themselves, are entrenched deeply enough for 
blend concepts to play a distinctively pivotal role in arriving at 
reasons. 
That blend concepts are reason-giving, combined with the ten-
dency of reasons to influence the state of the social world, explains 
why we consider the effects of applying a blend concept when deciding 
whether to do so. But I mean to offer more than an explanation here; 
I mean also to defend the permissibility of considering how one wants 
the social world to be when deciding whether to apply a blend concept 
in a novel, and perhaps controversial, situation. More concretely, I 
am claiming that your knowledge of the ramifications of concluding 
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that it is not rude to interrupt phone solicitors may appropriately in-
fluence your decision about whether interrupting phone solicitors is 
rude. Likewise, the knowledge that finding Sally's conduct negligent 
will discourage, others from behaving as Sally did may appropriately 
influence the determination of whether she was negligent. The permis-
sibility of considering how one wants the social world to be when ap-
plying blend concepts is another distinguishing feature of blend 
concepts. 34 
Admittedly, I have been oversimplifying. It is not, of course, ap-
propriate to apply blend concepts simply according to one's whims, or 
even one's well-considered preferences, as to how the world should be, 
basing application solely on how its application affects one's personal 
goals. Although I will qualify my point, let me emphasize its lesson: 
when applying a blend concept, one appropriately acts from the in-
terventionist stance toward the social world. Contrast this posture 
with the descriptivist stance appropriate when applying concepts be-
longing to the natural sciences or concepts of everyday representa-
tional talk. From within the interventionist stance, it is suitable to 
take into account a concept's reason-givingness when deciding 
whether and how to use it. Not only does the concept's world-guided-
ness not entirely dictate how it should be applied, but a correct re-
sponse to this situation is consciously to base one's decision to apply 
the concept, at least in part, on the reasons that application will yield. 
From within the descriptivist stance, however, even when a concept's 
world-guidedness leaves a particular application up for grabs, it is not 
suitable to decide whether to use the concept on the basis of how its 
use will influence actions, valuings, and judgments. In a descriptivist 
stance, the correct response to the limits of world-guidedness is to seek 
more information about the state of the world or to withhold applica-
tion of the concept. 
Note that I am making overtly normative claims when I say that, 
in the case of blend concepts but not others, an interventionist stance 
is appropriate. I am not denying that one might try to use proton from 
an interventionist stance - perhaps deciding to apply proton to a mys-
terious unprotonlike phenomenon when reporting experimental re-
sults, in order to give the National Science Foundation reason to fund 
one's next grant proposal, or, perhaps less glaringly instrumentally, to 
give oneself a reason to continue to advocate one's pet theory. I am 
arguing that one of the things that makes it clear that proton is not a 
blend concept is that, when faced with a potentially controversial ap-
34. This permissibility may well seem obvious to contemporary legal thinkers, although it 
would not have seemed so in a more formalist, less instrumentalist era. 
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plication of the concept, one's decision ought not depend on its impli-
cations for reasons, even if sometimes in actual fact such decisions do. 
A word about mundane applications of blend concepts is in order 
here. So far I have been highlighting the appropriateness of the in-
terventionist stance when applying blend concepts in controversial or 
novel circumstances. But the interventionist stance suits even run-of-
the-mill applications of blend concepts. Consider a prima facie uncon-
troversial, typical use of rude, such as the observation that it is rude 
for an adult to wipe his runny nose on his sleeve in front of others 
when there is a tissue at hand. Part of what makes such a case uncon-
troversial is that the matter of whether we want people to behave in 
this way is already settled. It is not that this use of rude is not from 
the interventionist stance; it is that the goal of the interventionism is 
already established and uncontentious. The acceptability of discour-
aging using one's sleeve as a handkerchief turns on some other, prima 
facie uncontroversial premises underlying the use of rude under con-
sideration, namely that rude behavior is worth less than polite behav-
ior and that the way to handle intimate bodily functions, particularly 
those related to secretions, falls under the jurisdiction of etiquette. In 
other words, the mundane application of the concept rude here turns 
on the settled place of rude in an evaluative taxonomy that uncon-
troversially covers the central facts of the situation at hand. Or con-
sider the uncontroversial judgment that it is negligent, other things 
equal, for a drunken doctor to perform surgery. Again, the goal of the 
interventionism that is indeed in play here is widely accepted: to avoid 
having drunken surgeons perform operations. Tort law's jurisdiction 
over this kind of conduct is also well established. What distinguishes a 
run-of-the-mill use of a blend concept from more problematic ones is 
uncertainty or controversy over the goal sought, the relationship be-
tween the evaluative taxonomy and the facts at hand, or the place of 
the candidate concept within the evaluative taxonomy to which it be-
longs. None of these variables - goal, relationship between evaluative 
taxonomy and the world, or relations between the categories of the 
taxonomy - exclusively governs appropriate application of a blend 
concept. Furthermore, none is a matter of sheer personal preference. 
Despite the interventionist stance apt for the use of blend concepts, 
their application is not entirely goal driven. Both their world-guided-
ness and the nature of their reason-givingness preclude this. Blend 
concepts are world-guided, and their world-guidedness has a norma-
tive quality to it. This means that their application is, to an extent, 
governed by facts about the world that have little or nothing to do 
with how a particular user of the concept wants the world to be. This 
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is why, under some circumstances, refusal to use - or insistence upon 
using - a blend concept seems odd, misguided, or downright mis-
taken. It just is not proper to consider someone who says "Please pass 
the salt" at a meal rude; nor is it proper to refuse to consider rude a 
healthy adult who takes food from everyone's plate with his hands and 
without asking permission. More glaringly, it is strange, as well as 
improper, to consider someone rude for sitting and taking a law school 
exam along with his classmates. These examples are not to deny that 
one can sometimes unusually apply a blend concept to great effect -
for example, "That pianist's rendition of was downright rude" 
- but the efficacy of such applications generally turns on their sensi-
tive, sometimes intricate, connection to the concept's basic world-
guidedness. What the examples indicate is that one cannot properly 
use rude just because one wants others to stop saying "Please pass the 
salt" or to stop taking law school exams or to eat off of others' plates. 
Similarly, one cannot properly call any old behavior negligent, no mat-
ter how much one wants to deter that behavior. It may be rude for an 
adult to wipe his runny nose on his sleeve in front of others when there 
is a tissue at hand, but, fanciful circumstances not prevailing, it is not 
negligent. Facts like the ones specified simply do not license use of the 
concept. The world-guidedness of a blend concept restricts the extent 
to ~hich its application can be goal-driven. 
This restriction is important. Without it, the reason-givingness of 
a blend concept would be undone. Blend concepts derive their reason-
givingness from their place within the evaluative taxonomies to which 
they belong. These taxonomies are responsive to specific human needs 
and interests, which they serve by categorizing the world in a particu-
lar way. The blend concepts that demarcate the categories of an eval-
uative taxonomy are reason-giving because they serve the evaluative 
point of the taxonomy. Now, suppose it were acceptable to "borrow" 
a blend concept's reason-givingness to serve any given interventionist 
goal. Suppose one insisted on applying rude to the act of taking law 
school exams in an effort to eliminate this behavior or insisted on ap-
plying negligent to the sleeve-wiping adult to discourage that activity. 
Unless one could give a good account of how these applications of 
rude and negligent vindicate the evaluative point(s) of etiquette and 
tort law, were one to persist in the proposed applications, one would 
be likely to undermine the concepts' reason-givingness. Others are 
likely to see through persistent, puzzling applications of a blend con-
cept and then to become suspicious of its reason-givingness even in 
more typical applications. 
This last point brings us to another crucial feature of blend con-
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cepts: they are community property. Neither their goal-directedness, 
their membership in an evaluative taxonomy, nor the structure of that 
taxonomy and the way it carves the world is a private matter. The 
social nature of blend concepts stems from the social nature of taxono-
mies of worth to which they belong. Such taxonomies are social 
goods; they reflect evaluations of merit shared, to some significant ex-
tent, amongst community members, rather than pure personal prefer.:. 
ences. Regardless of their metaphysical foundation, taxonomies of 
worth lay out evaluative distinctions shared within a community; 
blend concepts are used by members to influence themselves and one 
another.35 It is not surprising, then, that the facts that guide the appli-
cation of a blend concept are often social facts - facts constituted by 
social practices, conventional mores, shared cultural ideas, community 
values, and customs, all facts that often are best described in terms of 
further blend concepts. Nor is it surprising that the application of a 
blend concept often has a social impact, affecting how others value, 
judge, and act. 
The successful user of a blend concept - someone who applies it 
surefootedly in mundane cases and convincingly in novel or controver-
sial ones - is well aware of the interdependence of a blend concept's 
world-guidedness and reason-givingness. Such awareness is critical to 
the process of persuading others to accept a novel use of a blend con-
cept. Unless one appreciates the way in which a blend concept's 
world-guidedness is shaped by its reason-givingness and vice versa, 
one cannot distinguish brute factual analogies from more attenuated 
ones nor articulate sophisticated interpretations of a blend concept's 
place in an evaluative taxonomy or of that taxonomy's evaluative 
point. One needs to be able to explain to others, in a compelling way, 
why extending the application of a blend concept will not undermine 
its reason-givingness or why its reason-givingness is of the variety sali-
ent to the newly encountered situation. 36 
35. This is not to say that a community member cannot criticize or reject a particular taxon-
omy or category within it, see infra text accompanying notes 37-39, but to remark that to do so is 
to attack community property. 
36. It is the interdependence of a blend concept's world-guidedness and reason-givingness 
that cuts against the kind of analysis advocated by H.L.A. Hart or, from the philosophical side, 
R.M. Hare. Both Hart and Hare push analyses that would treat a blend concept as one that 
implicitly summarizes the facts that make a blend judgment apt and implicitly states a prescrip-
tive rule requiring certain consequences if those facts obtain. See HARE, supra note 11, at 56-62; 
Hart, supra note 12, at 43. In a Hart- or Hare-like analysis, these tasks are logically independent 
of one another, although blend concepts perform them simultaneously. Let us call such analyses 
"prescriptivist," as Hare's position is known in the philosophical literature. JORGEN 
HABERMAS, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification, in MORAL CON-
SCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 55 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry w. Nicholsen 
eds., 1990); R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON §§ 2.6-2.8 (1963); R.M. HARE, MORAL 
THINKING 52, 228 (1981); WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 82. The forgoing discussion in the text 
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One who possesses sensitive awareness and understanding of the 
way in which a particular blend concept's world-guidedness and rea-
son-givingness interrelate has "gotten" or "grasped" the concept. 
Note that I do not argue that, in order to "get" or "grasp" a blend 
concept, one must endorse the valuing, make the judgment, or per-
form the act for which the concept's application gives reason; nor do I 
hold that one must be motivated toward endorsing the valuing, mak-
ing the judgment, or performing the act. Rather, one must understand 
in what respects the concept is reason-giving. That is, one must un-
derstand its role in the overall responsiveness to some set of human 
needs and interests displayed by the taxonomy of worth to which the 
blend concept belongs. Evidence that one has "gotten" a blend con-
cept consists in the ability to use blend concepts in ways that are plau-
sible to other users, particularly in novel or controversial situations. 
Such deft usage enhances the concept's usefulness in making distinc-
tions of worth and further entrenches the concept in the social context. 
How far "inside" or "outside" a culture one must be to grasp a 
blend concept depends upon the needs and interests that inform the 
taxonomy of worth to which the concept belongs. It seems possible, 
even plausible, that to recognize and understand some needs and inter-
ests takes a great deal of cultural information and insight, including 
some that one could not acquire without a fairly significant immersion 
in the relevant culture. Of course, not all needs and interests are like 
this. Generally speaking, however, grasping a blend concept will re-
quire some degree of immersion: to wit, the need for the novice to 
immerse herself in caselaw to learn how to use negligence deftly; like-
wise, the impossibility of extracting a conclusive formula or algorithm 
for the deft usage of negligence. While there is no blanket rule stipu-
lating how one must be located vis-a-vis a particular culture in order 
to grasp its blend concepts, grasping a sophisticated blend concept will 
often require cultural knowledge and insight of a kind best gained 
through fairly intimate acquaintance with the relevant culture. 
Everything I have said about blend concepts so far applies to blend 
illustrates the shortcomings of a prescriptivist account of the use of blend concepts. Prescriptiv· 
ism might be telling the correct story about the logic of the content of blend concepts, but such a 
story will not make sense of what the use of such concepts involves. If blend concepts simply 
implicitly summarize facts and state prescriptive rules, then facts alone would always settle the 
issue of a blend concept's applicability. But if, as I have argued, deciding applicability appropri· 
ately requires sensitivity to the evaluative aspect of a blend concept, the prescriptivist has not 
made sense of the way in which application of blend concepts is world-guided because under· 
standing a blend concept's world-guidedness is not simply a matter of ascertaining some 
nonevaluatively delineated set of descriptive conditions. Personally, I doubt that prescriptivism 
even has the correct analysis of the logic of the content of blend concepts. Even if the distinction 
between content and use holds up, I think an adequate analysis of the content of blend concepts 
will not diverge as sharply from an adequate account of their use as does prescriptivist analysis. 
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concepts one finds distasteful or repugnant. Certain racist and sexist 
epithets qualify as blend concepts. Bitch and Jewish American Princess 
(J.A.P.) are world-guided, reason-giving members of taxonomies of 
worth that respond to particular human needs and interests. Grasping 
these concepts so as to be able to apply them deftly in novel or contro-
versial situations does require a sensitive understanding of their role in 
responding to these needs and interests. Under just what circum-
stances will users of J.A.P. apply it? To an observant Jew who is poor 
but has expensive tastes? To someone whose parents and ancestors 
were practicing Jews but who has converted to Protestantism and 
wears lots of gold jewelry and slightly flashy clothes? But just because 
a concept qualifies as a blend concept - and its reason-givingness 
must therefore be acknowledged - does not mean that one must use 
the concept. One might well refrain from using a distasteful or repug-
nant blend concept precisely because it is reason-giving, but in ways 
one wishes to reject. By the same token, one might discourage others 
from using the repugnant blend concept - or even insist that they do 
not. Whether a blend concept is repugnant or not is a substantive 
question in its own right, independent of the question of whether it is a 
blend concept. 
Rather than questioning or attacking any particular application of 
a blend concept, one can criticize repugnant or distasteful blend con-
cepts. One way to do so is to demonstrate the spuriousness or ugliness 
of the needs and interests that animate the taxonomy of worth to 
which the concept belongs. This strategy assails the parent taxonomy 
in order to undo the child concept. One can argue that bitch is part of 
a taxonomy of misogynist evaluation that answers to an interest in 
subjugating women, an interest that does not merit attention. One can 
argue that J.A.P. belongs to a taxonomy of racist and sexist evalua-
tions that serves the needs of certain empowered groups by inflaming 
racist and sexist tendencies; such needs ought not be addressed by the 
disempowered, who should resist the distractions of succumbing to ra-
cism. One can argue, as Morton Horwitz does, that negligence is part 
of a taxonomy animated by the interests of capitalists, 37 and one might 
further argue that these interests do not merit service. Another way to 
criticize a blend concept is to accept or endorse the relevant needs and 
interests but to deny that the concept plays a role in responding to 
these or that it does not play its putative role well. Consider, for ex-
ample, the concept macho. This concept belongs (arguably) to a tax-
onomy of masculine worth that serves an (arguably) important interest 
37. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 85-
108 (1977). 
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in delineating virtues and vices that are (arguably) especially salient to 
men in our society. One might maintain that macho carries too much 
conflicting baggage to perform satisfactorily as a member of such a 
taxonomy and that this baggage cannot be sorted to render the con-
cept helpful. Macho applies to a complicated combination of traits -
some valuable, others not - so it is hard to tell if macho delineates a 
virtue or a vice. One might argue that such an ambiguous concept 
does not contribute helpfully to a taxonomy of masculine worth. 
The forgoing illustrations do not exhaust the ways in which one 
might criticize a blend concept. I selected them to teach an important 
lesson. Often, the most pungent criticism of a blend concept requires 
an intimate grasp of it. To condemn the needs and interests animating 
a blend concept's home taxonomy requires a sensitive understanding 
of both the taxonomy and its evaluative point. To criticize the role or 
performance of a blend concept requires both this kind of understand-
ing and a sensitive awareness of the place and function of the concept 
within the home taxonomy. 
The lesson that the power of one's criticism often varies with the 
extent of one's grasp of a blend concept has a corollary: in coming to 
grasp a blend concept, one may ultimately tum against it. Sometimes 
familiarity breeds contempt. As one becomes intimately aware of the 
needs and interests animating a taxonomy of worth, the role a particu-
lar concept plays in addressing them, and the way in which the con-
cept performs its part, one may come to question the taxonomy or the 
concept. Eventually, one may reject one or both. That this can hap-
pen testifies to the difference between grasping and merely using a 
blend concept. Although this is ultimately an empirical question, it 
seems safe to assume that one need not have that sophisticated a grasp 
of a blend concept to use it uncontroversially in routine cases. One 
should be able to do this simply by mimicking other users. If one has 
grasped a blend concept, however, one is able to use it convincingly in 
novel or controversial situations. In such situations, mimicry obvi-
ously will not suffice. At such moments, those who merely use a blend 
concept will falter; those who grasp it will not. 38 
Coming to see that a blend concept is repugnant or distasteful may 
well necessitate a reflective, conscious grasp of the concept. Noticing 
what is wrong with a blend concept might take more than great famili-
arity with the relevant taxonomy of worth, its evaluative point, and so 
forth. One who possesses such familiarity might well be able to apply 
38. I am not suggesting that the latter will automatically apply the concept convincingly, just 
that they are likely to be able to figure out a way to go on that other users will accept. 
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the concept convincingly in novel or controversial cases, thereby evi-
dencing a grasp on the concept. Familiarity does not invariably breed 
contempt, however. In fact, familiarity sometimes makes it hard to 
see things as they really are. Moreover, being familiar with a taxon-
omy and its evaluative point is not the same as having a conscious, 
reflective understanding of it. This kind of understanding can bring 
out features of the taxonomy that one had not previously noticed, fea-
tures that problematize the taxonomy, its member concept(s), or both. 
Consider a regular user of intellectual, one who is intimately familiar 
with the concept and the relevant taxonomy of worth. Suppose she 
faces a novel situation in which she finds herself unwilling to apply the 
concept to a person whose intelligence she respects tremendously. She 
might be inspired to reflect upon the concept, the relevant taxonomy 
of worth, its evaluative point, and so forth. She might examine care-
fully, perhaps for the first time, the needs and interests that inform the 
taxonomy of worth to which intellectual belongs. It is possible that 
she would discover that these include some needs and interests she had 
not consciously noticed before, such as an interest in perpetuating elit-
ism. If, after developing a reflective grasp on the concept intellectual, 
she rejects the needs and interests to which it resp~nds, she may decide 
to abandon the concept. 39 
There are other stories to tell about how one might come to have a 
reflective grasp on a blend concept and thereby see it in a different 
light. Whatever the story, none represents a guaranteed method for 
bringing people to realize the repugnance of a repugnant blend con-
cept - but a reflective grasp on a blend concept with which one is 
deeply familiar can change one's understanding of it. 
Similarly, a reflective grasp on a concept not previously regarded 
as a blend concept might lead one to recognize that it is in fact such a 
concept. Some would argue, for example, that a reflective grasp on 
psychological concepts would reveal them to be blend concepts. This 
brings us back to schizophrenic. There is a debate about whether and 
what kind of valuation enters into social science. One camp maintains 
that distinctions of worth are part and parcel of the enterprise.40 Sup-
pose this is right, but not readily apparent to many who use psycho-
39. Of course, she might also decide to embrace the newly noticed needs and interests, or she 
might try to reform the concept rather than abandon it. Without fleshing out the example more 
fully, we can neither predict nor recommend a response. 
40. Of course, this camp's position is far more intricate and sophisticated than this. For the 
full-blown view, see TAYLOR, Interpretation, supra note 11; Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social 
Science, in RATIONALITY 1 (Bryan R. Wilson ed., 1970). For an example of one who takes this 
position specifically with regard to psychological concepts, see R.D. LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF 
(1960). 
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logical concepts often and skillfully.41 Developing a reflective grasp 
on these concepts might show such users that the concepts make up an 
evaluative taxonomy, whose member concepts they apply from an in-
terventionist stance, in accordance with both their world-guided and 
reason-giving elements. This could shift these users' conception of 
psychology and the other social sciences. On the other hand, those 
who hold that distinctions of worth do and should figure prominently 
in social science might be mistaken. One who wanted to show this 
might vindicate the correctness of the descriptive stance for the appli-
cation of psychological concepts, demonstrate that the taxonomy of 
psychological concepts has an exclusively explanatory point, and so 
on. Without further investigation, I could not take a stand in this 
debate. What I have tried to do here is sketch how one might plausi-
bly come to re.cognize schizophrenic as a blend concept. The plausibil-
ity of this possibility agrees with my intuition that schizophrenic need 
not clearly fall outside an acceptable delineation of blend concepts, as 
should chair and proton. 
So far I have discussed the ways in which a reflective grasp on a 
blend concept can lead to recognition or rejection. In these cases, one 
works from the concept, so to speak, toward a conscious understand-
ing of the human needs and interests to which it responds. Sometimes 
one is disgusted by what one discovers upon acquiring this under-
standing; sometimes one is edified. In another kind of case, the path 
from concept to conscious understanding of human needs and inter-
ests is followed - but in reverse. In these instances, a reflective 
awareness of a set of human needs and interests enables, and perhaps 
spurs, one to engineer a taxonomy of worth so as to yield the evalua-
tive power with which to address those needs and interests. In the 
extreme case, one starts this task from scratch. In the simplest case, 
one tinkers with a concept already part of a long-standing taxonomy 
of worth. Somewhere in between are the cases in which one takes a 
blend or quasi-blend concept already current in the culture and con-
sciously cultivates it as a blend concept, perhaps by articulating more 
clearly the latent taxonomy of worth to which it belongs or the role it 
could play in that taxonomy. Many "technical" concepts or "terms of 
art" are engineered blend concepts. Negligence and its sister concepts 
are examples of blend concepts that appear in nonlegal discourse and 
41. Perhaps their training obscured the evaluative aspect of the concepts they were learning 
to use. The possibility that training can be effective without making that aspect clear raises a 
number of other possibilities. It might well be the case that training in the use of a blend concept, 
even training intended to result in a reflective grasp of the concept, is best effected by reserving 
overt instruction as to the evaluative aspect of the concept until the learner has, through mim-
icry, mastered very ordinary usage. 
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then receive conscious cultivation from legal specialists, including 
courts, lawyers, and legal scholars. The cultivated term of art re-
sponds to the needs and interests that inform negligence in a more 
refined and powerful way than does its uncultivated ordinary language 
counterpart. 
When cultivating a blend concept, one consciously and explicitly 
designs its world-guidedness and reason-givingness so that it can per-
form effectively in responding to the needs and interests that inspired 
the effort in the first place. Shaping the concept suitably is one step 
toward ensuring that it catches on. One cannot, however, just select 
any old needs and interests to address. A distinguishing feature of 
blend concepts is that they belong to taxonomies of worth that purport 
to respond to communally endorsed needs and interests, as opposed to 
purely private or personal needs and interests. To engineer a blend 
concept successfully one must embed it in a taxonomy that at least 
apparently responds to needs and interests communally endorsed by a 
group of potential users. So, for example, one evaluative point of tort 
law is the vindication of popular-moral intuitions about corrective jus-
tice and unacceptably dangerous behavior. Negligence and related tort 
concepts speak to the interests latent in these popular-moral intuitions; 
hence negligence maintains its reason-givingness in its capacity as a 
term of art. 
Some blend concepts merely purport to respond to communally 
endorsed needs and interests. Racial and sexual epithets, for example, 
purport to be responsive to communally endorsed needs and interests, 
but the needs and interests they actually address are not in fact com-
munally endorsed - assuming that the community in question in-
cludes members of the disfavored racial or ethnic group. This 
assumption may well be questionable. Use of racial and sexual epi-
thets often represents an effort to define the boundaries of community. 
Community boundaries, however, are subject to debate. One way to 
criticize a racist, sexist, or other blend concept would be to show that 
the needs and interests to which it purports to respond are not actually 
communally endorsed because the community does not in fact endorse 
them. Another way would be to show that those who communally 
endorse them do not really comprise the community. In the end, to 
complete our account of how to criticize and defend blend concepts, 
we need a story about how to define communities. This story will be 
complicated by the fact that blend concepts play a role in the process 
of community definition. Although I will not attempt this story here, 
I want to emphasize that blend concepts purport to live up to com-
munally endorsed needs and interests. In Part II, I will argue that the 
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failure of a blend concept to deliver on this promise sharply stunts its 
capacity to figure in objective judgments. 
Before turning to the issue of objectivity, I would like to emphasize 
a theme that runs throughout my characterization of blend concepts: 
their social nature. Blend concepts are social in the following interre-
lated and mutually supporting respects. 
1. They tend to be world-guided by social facts, such as conventional 
mores, shared cultural ideas, community values, and customs. 
2. Their application affects the social world, and it is appropriate to 
take this into account when deciding whether to apply a blend concept in 
a new or controversial case. 
3. They belong to taxonomies of worth that reflect intersubjective eval-
uations of merit, not just personal preferences. 
4. They purport responsiveness to communally endorsed needs and 
interests. 
Vindicating this multifaceted social nature is, as I shall argue in Part 
II, essential to the objectivity of a blend judgment. 
II. OBJECTIVITY 
Critics of the concept of objectivity sometimes write as if it is a bad 
concept because it can never answer to our demands of it. Catharine 
MacKinnon, for example, argues that "women's interest lies in over-
throwing the distinction [between subjective and objective] itself. "42 
Or they skeptically question particular applications of the concept in a 
way that suggests an overall distrust of it. MacKinnon continues, 
"[f]eminism does not see its view as subjective, partial, or undeter-
mined but as a critique of the purported generality, disinterestedness, 
and universality of previous accounts."43 Duncan Kennedy writes 
about the "initial apparent objectivity of [an] objectionable [legal] 
rule": "from my point of view the application of the rule to this case 
feels like a nondiscretionary, necessary, compulsory procedure."44 He 
goes on to call this "the pseudo-objectivity of the rule-as-applied."45 
Richard Delgado speaks of critical race theory's "distrust oflaw's neu-
tral and objective facade."46 
Criticisms such as these indicate what we want out of objectivity: 
a contrast from the arbitrary, the whimsical, the idiosyncratic, the 
purely personal. We want the objective not to be - in a word -
subjective, as in the dismissive comment, "Well, you're just being sub-
42. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 120-21. 
43. Id. at 121. 
44. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 520. 
45. Id. at 522. 
46. Delgado, supra note 1, at 744. 
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jective about this." The reason this comment is dismissive is that, in 
the situations in which such a comment is at all appropriate, we feel 
entitled to ignore a judgment on the ground of its subjectivity. On the 
other hand, sometimes we feel that we ourselves or others are not enti-
tled to ignore or flout certain judgments. We feel that some judgments 
exert interpersonal validity, even with regard to individuals who do 
not agree with or accept them. Our concern for interpersonal validity, 
and hence objectivity, varies from context to context. In any case, in a 
variety of contexts there are some judgments for which we think that 
we can give reasons that would sustain their interpersonal validity and 
hence preserve them from being arbitrary, whimsical, idiosyncratic, or 
purely personal. 
From these desires, feelings, and thoughts a concept of objectivity 
emerges, according to which the objective is that which possesses in-
terpersonal validity by virtue of the reasons in its favor. This delinea-
tion of the concept is quite abstract and, therefore, elastic. I consider 
this an advantage because of the diversity of kinds of judgments whose 
objectivity we measure. But the abstraction and elasticity pose a con-
comitant disadvantage: by itself, the concept of objectivity tells us 
very little about what it takes for a specific type of judgment to be 
objective. For this task, we need specific conceptions of objectivity, 
conceptions suitable for the types of judgment in question.47 A con-
ception of objectivity suitable for a certain kind of judgment should 
tell us why interpersonal validity matters in the context for which the 
conception is suitable, and what it takes for a judgment of that kind to 
exert interpersonal validity. The answers to these two questions will 
be intimately connected. 
In this Part, I develop a conception of objectivity suitable for blend 
judgments. I accomplish this via exploration of alternative concep-
tions of objectivity that are suitable for scientific and moral or political 
judgments. I consider their adequacy as models for a conception of 
objectivity suitable for blend judgments. I conclude that neither scien..,. 
tific nor moral-rationalist conceptions of objectivity can serve as is, 
47. Often those writing about objectivity fail to distinguish between the concept of objectivity 
and more particular conceptions of it. Kent Greenawalt's recent book provides an example. See 
KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 3-7 (1992). Greenawalt surveys a number of 
(what I would call) different conceptions of objectivity and considers whether any or all are 
suitable to law. Among the conceptions he discusses are objectivity as determinacy of rules, see 
id. at 11-89, objectivity as impartial treatment, see id. at 93-159, and objectivity as moral, polit-
ical, or economic rightness. See id. at 163-235. Greenawalt's survey seems rather disjointed, in 
part because he does not identify the concept of objectivity that would unify the various concep-
tions he considers. He also does not consider whether different conceptions might be more or 
less suitable to different kinds of legal judgments, depending on the type of concept applied in 
each kind. Not all legal judgments apply blend concepts. The conception of objectivity I develop 
here is suitable for blend legal judgments but may well not be suitable for other kinds. 
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although they provide insight into what such a conception of objectiv-
ity must include. After articulating the blend conception of objectiv-
ity, I then use it as a regulative ideal against which to measure the 
objectivity of specific blend judgments, demonstrating the critical bite 
of the blend conception. Finally, I argue that the blend conception's 
pragmatic orientation makes it a practically workable regulative ideal. 
I should emphasize from the outset that the blend conception of 
objectivity, which specifies a set of conditions for objectivity in blend 
judgments, is not a pure proceduralist conception: it does not specify 
a procedure that, simply by virtue of its operation, renders the out-
come - whatever it might be - objective.48 Rather, it provides a 
reliable heuristic for generating objective blend judgments, including 
objective blend legal judgments. The conditions specified by the blend 
conception are neither necessary nor sufficient for objectivity in blend 
judgment - that is, a legal judgment might be interpersonally valid by 
virtue of the reasons in its favor even if it has not been arrived at 
through a process that fulfills these conditions, and the process is not a 
guarantee that the judgment will be interpersonally valid by virtue of 
the reasons in its favor. Nonetheless, if the conditions specified by the 
blend conception are fulfilled in the process of coming to a legal judg-
ment, then it is very likely that the judgment will possess a high degree 
of objectivity. 
A. Scientific and Moral-Rationalist Conceptions of Objectivity 
There is more than one scientific conception of objectivity, which is 
to say that there is disagreement over what it takes for a scientific 
judgment to exert interpersonal validity. The different scientific con-
ceptions fall into two categories, ontological and methodological. At 
the heart of a scientific-ontological conception of objectivity lies the 
idea that a scientific judgment is objective insofar as it corresponds to 
facts about the world, facts that obtain regardless of the scientists 
themselves. In this kind of conception, objective scientific judgments 
exert interpersonal validity because, despite variations in individual 
beliefs, goals, or desires, the facts that make a scientific judgment ob-
jective remain the same.49 Given that the goal of science is prediction 
48. A lottery is an example of a pure proceduralist device: whatever number is chosen by the 
established selection procedure is, by definition, the winner. There is no independent criterion 
for defining the winning number. 
49. Peter Railton advances this conception of objectivity. Peter Railton, Marx and the 
Objectivity of Science, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 763 (Richard Boyd et al. eds., 1991). 
Railton presents the scientific-ontological conception as an epistemically extemalist conception. 
According to his account, a scientific judgment's objectivity does not depend upon whether the 
scientist who holds the judgment is aware of the facts that make it objective. One could present a 
more epistemically intemalist scientific-ontological conception by adding to the requirement of 
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and control of the natural world, it makes sense for different scientists, 
whatever differences in belief, goal, or desire they may have, to accept 
objective scientific judgments because scientific-ontologically objective 
judgments track that world and are therefore helpful in predicting and 
controlling it. 
Proponents of scientific-methodological conceptions of objectivity 
agree that prediction and control of the natural world is a major goal 
of science, but they deny that objectivity in scientific judgment is a 
matter of correspondence to facts that obtain regardless of the scien-
tist's beliefs, goals, desires, or representations of the facts themselves. 50 
According to an individualist scientific-methodological conception, a 
scientific judgment is objective when it is the product of a method that 
publicly tests interpersonally comprehensible hypotheses against ob-
servational, experiential data. This conception is individualist because 
the method it recommends can, in principle, be performed by a single 
individual, working alone.51 An alternative scientific-methodological 
conception is more socialist. A socialist scientific-methodological con-
ception incorporates the individualist conception of objectivity but 
adds to it a requirement that, for a scientific judgment to be objective, 
the judgment, its background theoretical assertions, hypotheses, and 
assumptions, and the interpretation of its supporting data must all be 
proffered for and receive public scrutiny and criticism from diverse 
quarters. 52 For both individualist and socialist scientific-methodologi-
cal conceptions, publicity is the cornerstone of objectivity. The social-
ist conception, however, requires collective participation, whereas the 
correspondence a requirement that a scientist who holds the judgment in question must also be 
aware of this correspondence. 
SO. Note that advocates of scientific-methodological conceptions can consistently maintain 
that the truth of a scientific judgment, even if not its objectivity, is a matter of correspondence to 
facts that obtain regardless of the scientist's beliefs, goals, desires, or representations of the facts 
themselves. 
51. Representatives of the individualist scientific-methodological camp include Carl Hempel 
and Bas van Fraassen. See, e.g., CARL HEMPEL, AsPECIS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND 
OTHER EssAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 141 (1965); BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN, THE 
SCIENTIFIC IMAGE 82 (1980). 
52. Feminist philosophy of science has produced the strongest proponents of socialist scien-
tific-methodological conceptions. These include Sandra Harding, Helen Longino, and Lynn 
Nelson. See HARDING, supra note 1, at 105-37, 150; HELEN LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL 
KNOWLEDGE 62-82 (1990); Helen Longino, Essential Tensions-Phase Two: Feminist, Philo-
sophical, and Social Studies of Science, in A MIND OF ONE'S OWN 157-72 (Louise M. Antony & 
Charlotte Witt eds., 1993); LYNN H. NELSON, WHO KNOWS: FROM QUINE TO A FEMINIST 
EMPIRICISM 43-81, 255-99 (1990). Longino emphasizes the necessity of "recognized avenues for 
criticism," such as journals, conferences, and the institution of peer review, all of which provide 
arenas for public scrutiny and criticism. LoNGINO, supra, at 76. Harding, who writes from a 
different wing of feminist philosophy, emphasizes the need to study scientifically background 
cultural beliefs and assumptions about different individuals and groups who participate in scien-
tific inquiry. HARDING, supra note 1, at 149. 
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individualist conception does not. On either conception, the publicity 
of objective judgments lends them interpersonal validity because pub-
licity helps ensure that scientific judgments adequately explain empiri-
cal appearances, whatever theories, norms, values, beliefs, or desires 
inform a particular scientist's judgments. s3 Empirical adequacy facili-
tates prediction and control of natural phenomena; objective judg-
ments thereby serve the central scientific goal. Thus, it makes sense 
for them to exert interpersonal validity amongst scientists and others 
who share a belief in the goals of science. 
For present purposes, we need not settle the question of which sci-
entific conception of objectivity is most suitable for scientific judg-
ments. Although the scientific conceptions can help us delineate the 
specifications of the blend conception of objectivity,s4 at this point we 
need to see why scientific conceptions do not provide a conception of 
objectivity suitable to blend judgments. In both the scientific-ontologi-
cal and scientific-methodological conceptions, a judgment's interper-
sonal validity depends upon its service to the goal of prediction and 
control of natural phenomena. On the scientific-ontological concep-
tion, correspondence to the natural world is the reason an objective 
scientific judgment exerts interpersonal validity. On the scientific-
methodological conceptions, satisfying some kind of publicity require-
ment is the reason an objective scientific judgment exerts interpersonal 
validity. Although the mechanism of service is different according to 
the two types of scientific objectivity, in each of them objective judg-
ments exert interpersonal validity because they serve the goal of pre-
diction and control of natural phenomena. This is not the goal, 
however, in domains such as law, etiquette, humor, and aesthetics, in 
which we apply blend concepts. So a conception of objectivity pre-
mised on that goal makes little sense for blend judgments, which, un-
like scientific ones, are not from the descriptivist stance made 
efficacious for prediction and controi.ss Notice that, even on the scien-
53. Some advocates of scientific-methodological conceptions, such as Hempel and Longino, 
are realists; they take empirical adequacy to warrant ontological inferences about how the natu-
ral world is, independent of particular theories, norms, values or beliefs and desires. Others, like 
van Fraassen, are instrumentalists and reject such inferences. Note that, regardless of whether or 
not they are instrumentalists, scientific-methodological proponents advocate epistemically in-
ternalist conceptions of objectivity: those executing a scientific method that is sufficiently public 
to confer objectivity will be consciously applying procedures with the power to do this, creating 
an internalist connection between objectivity and awareness of what makes certain judgments 
objective. 
54. See infra text accompanying notes 72-77. 
55. It is the unsuitability of a scientific-ontological conception to blend judgments that seems 
to prompt Bernard Williams's conclusion that converged-upon scientific judgments are objective 
whereas converged-upon thick ethical judgments are unlikely to be objective. WILLIAMS, supra 
note 11, at 151-53. When he discusses scientific judgments, Williams appears to have in mind a 
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tific-ontological conception, correspondence to natural fact is not, in 
itself, constitutive of objectivity. Correspondence amounts to objectiv-
ity, on that conception, because correspondence creates interpersonal 
validity by facilitating prediction and control. Even the scientific-
ontological conception, then, does not treat objectivity simply as a 
matter of metaphysics. 
If scientific conceptions of objectivity do not provide ready-made 
models for a conception of blend objectivity, perhaps moral-rationalist 
conceptions do. According to moral-rationalist conceptions of objec-
tivity, a moral or political judgment is objective when a specified group 
of people - the specification varies from version to version - largely 
agrees upon it or would largely agree upon it; again, views as to 
whether agreement must be actual or may be hypothetical vary.56 Ac-
cording to such conceptions, agreed-upon moral and political judg-
ments exert interpersonal validity because agreement signals that they 
are acceptable to the individual members of the specified group. This 
means that agreed-upon moral and political judgments serve the end 
of coordinating action in mutually acceptable fashion, without resort 
to force and violence - a major goal of morality and politics accord-
ing to certain leading accounts. 57 
As do scientific conceptions of objectivity, moral-rationalist con-
ceptions fall into two categories. They can be dialogical or monologi-
cal. I will consider Jiirgen Habermas's dialogical moral-rationalist 
conception of objectivity and then John Rawls's monological moral-
rationalist conception. Habermas delivers an account of when 
"purer" normative judgments of what ought to be done qualify as ob-
jective. 58 He maintains that discourse of a certain kind - which he 
labels "argumentation"59 - produces objectivity. In other words, a 
scientific-ontological conception of their objectivity. Id. at 136, 152. Due to the scientific-onto-
logical conception's unsuitability for thick judgments, it makes sense that, when measured by this 
conception, thick judgments fail to seem objective. Williams himself suggests an alternative, 
Aristotelian conception of objectivity that, he concedes, might show how thick ethical judgments 
could be objective, but he doubts that such a conception can in fact be developed. Id. at 152-55. 
The blend conception of objectivity I advance later in this chapter is nothing like the Aristotelian 
conception to which Williams refers. 
56. Jiirgen Habermas and John Rawls each deliver versions of the moral-rationalist concep-
tion of objectivity. Both consider agreement (actual, in the case of Habermas; hypothetical, in 
the case of Rawls) essential to objectivity. HABERMAS, supra note 36, at 65; JOHN RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 112, 119 (1993). 
57. Contemporary representatives include Allan Gibbard and John Rawls. See GIBBARD, 
supra note 11, at 322-25; RAWLS, supra note 56, at 8-11; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
3-6 (1971). 
58. I use the term purer normative judgments to refer to judgments that apply normative 
concepts that are significantly less or less directly - some would argue, not at all - world-
guided than are blend concepts. Ought is such a concept. 
59. HABERMAS, supra note 36, at 44, 45-47, 57-68. 
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judgment is objective if and only if it is reached through the process of 
argumentation. Argumentation is the process of publicly and collec-
tively providing reasons for and against a judgment. Public provision 
of reasons ensures that the judgment is the product of a rational, genu-
ine consensus rather than the outcome of strategic manipulation. The 
ground rules for argumentation are: (1) every competent speaker-
actor is allowed to participate; (2) everyone is allowed to question, to 
introduce any assertion, or both and to express his attitude, desires, 
and needs; and (3) no speaker may be prevented, by any form of coer-
cion, from exercising the rights specified in the first two ground rules. 
These ground rules presuppose that objectivity consists in satisfying 
principle U: "All affected can accept the consequences and the side 
effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satis-
faction of everyone's interests (and these consequences are preferred to 
those of known alternative possibilities for regulation)."60 
Habermas's dialogical moral-rationalist conception suffers from a 
number of problems. To start with a relatively minor one, the "tran-
scendental-pragmatic" argument Habermas advances in favor of U 
does not wash. Habermas argues that anybody attempting to dispute 
U via argumentation finds herself presupposing U. That is, so long as 
the opponent of U takes herself to be voicing her opposition within a 
process oriented toward genuine understanding and consensus, she 
must be regarding herself as abiding by the ground rules that in fact 
build U into the foundation of practical discourse. The two most 
prominent difficulties with Habermas's defense of U against the skep-
tic lie in his arguably questionable characterization of argumentation 
and his inadequate response to the skeptic who rejects U via some 
nonargumentative mechanism. Habermas's conception of argumenta-
tion rules out repression and coercion, by definition. Insofar as impos-
ing normative judgments on (some of) those affected without their 
genuine consent and understanding is coercive, repressive, or both -
and it often is - doing so is indeed incompatible with Habermasian 
argumentation. But other conceptions of what might plausibly qualify 
as argument not only do not stipulate the inadmissibility of coercion 
and repression, but would in fact license some forms of these activities 
as inherently part of the process of argument - manipulation by rhet-
oric, for example. Habermas might correct for this problem by sur-
rendering the term argumentation. He could accept that there are 
other conceptions of that activity with equally valid claim to the term, 
conceptions that would not serve his purposes against the skeptic; he 
60. Id. at 65. 
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might then appropriate another term, such as practical discourse, and 
run his argument against the U-skeptic accordingly. There are two 
snags in this strategy, though. One, the more rarefied the term 
Habermas appropriates, the more it suggests that the activity in ques-
tion is rather specialized and, hence, that the opponent of U can op-
pose without engaging in it - without, that is, engaging in an activity 
that requires her to presuppose U. Two, whatever the terms, 
Habermas's defense of U tends toward question begging. The question 
at hand is, must we have everybody's genuine consent to and agree-
ment upon normative judgments? If Habermas stipulates that the 
only practice or activity that could vindicate a negative answer to this 
question must itself meet its conditions, he clearly begs the question. 
In an effort to avoid this problem, Habermas argues that he is not 
making any stipulations here: he is simply noting a fact about what he 
calls the logic of argumentation or discourse - a fact that just exists, 
that is not capable of some sort of "ultimate justification."61 But this 
argument merely returns us to the quagmire of trying to ascertain that 
Habermas's understanding of argumentation or practical discourse 
holds up. Note that Habermas cannot resort to an outright normative 
claim here, such as the claim that we must (morally) have everybody's 
consent, because then he definitely cannot catch the skeptic. 
Regardless of whether Habermas can defend U to the thorough-
going skeptic, U has other problems as a constitutive criterion of ob-
jectivity. U requires unanimous acceptance, under conditions of 
argumentation. This seems to be a way of guaranteeing standpoint-
independence. But, even if the ground rules for argumentation are in 
place, argumentation might not produce standpoint-independent judg-
ments. Just because everybody is allowed to speak and to question 
does not mean that everybody will. Even when everybody does speak, 
differences in style and status will afford some -yoices more weight. 
Furthermore, even if no speaker is silenced, all contributions receive 
equal consideration, and convergence results, the judgment reached 
still may not be objective, despite its standpoint-independence. Objec-
tivity, even on the moral-rationalist conception, requires more. Objec-
tivity also requires that reasons support the judgment, and 
convergence at the end of a process of argumentation need not be con-
vergence based on reasons. Imagine a group in which people did noth-
ing in support or criticism of a judgment but express their individual 
desires. The group reaches consensus on the basis of which desires are 
expressed most lustily, most prevalently, or both. Depending on the 
61. Id. at 94-98. 
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nature of the judgment, we may not think individual desires count as 
reasons for it. For the desire-driven group, convergence after argu-
mentation may not signal objectivity. The same could be said about 
judgments based entirely on expressions of attitude or need. 
Finally, and most seriously, Habermas's constitutive criterion of 
objectivity is wildly unrealistic. It puts any serious degree of objectiv-
ity out of reach. According to Habermas, U sets the major condition a 
judgment must meet to qualify for objectivity: everybody affected by 
the judgment must be able to accept the anticipated consequences of 
its general observance. Given this condition, one might think that 
Habermas would accept some sort of hypothetical or counterfactual 
test for determining whether a judgment satisfies U, whereby an indi-
vidual or a group of individuals goes through a thought experiment to 
see whether all affected would, if they were consulted, "be able to" 
accept the judgment in question. This alternative resembles the 
method Rawls advocates in A Theory of Justice, in which he asks each 
reader individually to construct the original position and then conduct 
the deliberations that would take place there. 62 Habermas, however, 
explicitly rejects this kind of hypothetical or counterfactual 
proceduralism. He says that "the justification of norms and com-
mands requires that a real discourse be carried out and thus cannot 
occur in a strictly monological form, i.e., in the form of a hypothetical 
process of argumentation occurring in the individual mind."63 He also 
makes it clear that not only does full objectivity elude any judgment 
tested "monologically," but that, in his view, U "suggests the perspec-
tive of real-life argumentation, in which all affected are admitted as 
participants."64 When Habermas says that all affected must be able to 
accept the consequences of a judgment if that judgment is to qualify as 
objective, he really means that all affected must accept the conse-
quences of the judgment. This comes as no surprise when one remem-
bers the rules of discourse he claims U presupposes. 65 These stress the 
actual participation of every speaker-actor affected. Although 
Habermas does not state this explicitly, it seems quite clear that in his 
view for a judgment to achieve genuine objectivity, all those affected 
must participate in argumentation regarding it, and all participants 
must consent to it. 
The problem is that this seems to make any serious degree of objec-
tivity unattainable. Some of our most important judgments - be they 
62. RAWLS, supra note 57, at 17-22. 
63. HABERMAS, supra note 36, at 68. 
64. Id. at 66. 
65. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
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purer normative ones or blend judgments - affect so many people 
that it is hard to conceive of a discursive procedure that could include 
all of them when a particular judgment's objectivity has been called 
into question. Even if technology could enable discussion on a far 
wider scale than we have managed to date, the costs of such discus-
sion, in terms of time alone, are daunting. Additionally, the prospect 
of such discussion resulting in consensus - even in very near consen-
sus - is minimal. Moreover, even if we thought this alternative to be 
worth the costs and even if consensus were obtained, massively wide-
scale discourse still would not meet Habermas's conditions. Given 
that legal and political judgments will affect people who do not yet 
exist, it is impossible to obtain the consent of all those affected by these 
judgments. 
Habermas might well respond that, although the conditions he sets 
are for full objectivity, objectivity is, after all, a matter of degree. He 
might regard his specification as a regulative ideal, to be approximated 
in practice. I too think that objectivity comes in degrees, 66 but 
Habermas's regulative ideal is excessively ambitious. Our efforts to 
conform to an overly ambitious ideal are likely to be clumsy and dis-
satisfying. Habermas's scheme illustrates the problem well. Assume 
for the moment that Habermas has provided an attractive regulative 
ideal of objectivity. Even if this were so, it is impossible to say, with 
any degree of conviction, which practically feasible approximation of 
practical discourse is likely to preserve best this procedure's efficacy in 
guaranteeing objectivity. Acknowledging pragmatic constraints does 
not tell us just how to modify practical discourse so as to afford it 
appropriate regulatory force. For instance, if we are not going to in-
clude all affected, by what principle should we choose whom to in-
clude to get a successful approximation of impartiality? 
Representatives of each group affected? If so, how do we decide which 
members are representative for these purposes? Or should we elimi-
nate those groups most likely to have a distorting influence if they are 
included at the expense of other groups? Moreover, who finally gets to 
decide which approximation we will use and how it will be imple-
mented? If we manage to appoint a group of deliberators, we still need 
to handle the matter of consensus. Anybody who has ever engaged in 
group deliberations knows how hard uncoerced consensus is to 
achieve. When approximating practical discourse, should we settle for 
less than complete consensus? If so, what should the rule be? Some-
thing simple, like a two-thirds majority suffices to establish the objec-
66. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
1222 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:1187 
tivity of a judgment? Or something more nuanced, which takes 
account of who happens to be consenting and who happens to be dis-
senting? Neither of these alternatives seem satisfactory. Maybe we 
should continue to rely on having complete consensus but weaken the 
prohibition on coercion. Maybe we should allow some forms of coer-
cion on the ground that they do not undermine too much the objectiv-
ity of the ultimate judgment. We might allow people to display the 
kind of impatience that silences others into agreement, for instance. 
But it is hard to see how this would not be a threat to the kind of 
objectivity indicated by Habermasian practical discourse. 
My point is not that a conception of objectivity suitable for blend 
concepts - or any other conception of objectivity, for that matter -
cannot or should not be responsive to pragmatic considerations. My 
point is that it must be responsive to them. Premising such a concep-
tion on an excessively ambitious regulative ideal, however, detracts 
from the effort. By designing a conception for conditions that cannot 
ever practically be met, one simply creates complex problems about 
how to adapt the account to the conditions in which we are. It would 
be much better to design our conception on the basis of our actual 
circumstances. 
One way to remedy much of the impracticality of Habermas's dia-
logical moral-rationalist conception would be to eliminate dialogue as 
a prerequisite to objectivity. Monological moral-rationalist concep-
tions of objectivity, such as John Rawls's, do just this.67 Rawls ad-
vances the following conception of the objectivity of moral-political 
judgments. 
Political convictions (which are also, of course, moral convictions) are 
objective - actually founded on an order of reasons - if reasonable and 
rational persons, who are sufficiently intelligent and conscientious in ex-
ercising their powers of practical reason, and whose reasoning exhibits 
none of the familiar defects of reasoning, would eventually endorse those 
convictions, or significantly narrow their differences about them, pro-
vided that these persons know the relevant facts and have sufficiently 
surveyed the grounds that bear on the matter under conditions favorable 
to due reflection .... To say that a political conviction is objective is to 
say that there are reasons, specified by a reasonable and mutually recog-
67. Rawls proffers an articulation of the concept of objectivity, along with three possible 
conceptions. RAWLS, supra note 56, at 110-21. In addition to the political·constructivist con-
ception Rawls favors, he discusses a rational-intuition conception and a Kantian-moral construc-
tivist conception. Here I will concentrate upon Rawls's preferred conception, the political-
constructivist one. I do not adopt Rawls's articulation of the concept of objectivity because it is, 
in my opinion, overly baroque. Rawls delineates five "essential elements of a conception of objec-
tivity," each of which is quite complex. Id. at 110-15. I prefer my own more simple articulation, 
see supra text accompanying note 47, according to which the objective is that which possesses 
interpersonal validity in virtue of the reasons in its favor. 
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nizable political conception, sufficient to convince all reasonable persons 
that it is reasonable. 68 
The Rawlsian conception of objectivity differs from the Habermasian 
one in a number of respects. First and foremost, it is monological 
rather than dialogical. On the Rawlsian conception, a moral-political 
judgment need not go through any dialogical process, such as 
Habermasian argumentation, for it to be objective. A single individ-
ual's judgment, formed in total isolation from others, could be objec-
tive, if others would (largely) agree with it. This brings us to the 
second difference. The Rawlsian conception requires only hypotheti-
cal agreement rather than actual agreement. So a judgment can be 
objective even if others have not even considered it, let alone whether 
they already agree to it. Finally, the third difference between the 
Rawlsian and Habermasian conceptions lies in the scope of the people 
who must actually, or would have to, agree to a judgment for it to be 
objective. Whereas Habermas insists that agreement come from all 
those affected by the judgment, Rawls insists only that it come from 
those "reasonable and rational persons, who are sufficiently intelligent 
and conscientious in exercising their powers of practical reason, and 
whose reasoning exhibits none of the familiar defects of reasoning"69 
- clearly, a subset of all those affected by most political judgments. 
Each of the forgoing differences makes Rawls's monological 
moral-rationalist conception of objectivity more practical than 
Habermas's dialogical conception. Monological application is easier 
to execute than dialogical application; hypothetical agreement is easier 
to achieve than actual agreement; agreement with "reasonable," intel-
ligent, conscientious, correctly reasoning people tends to come easier 
than agreement with "unreasonable," stupid, careless, or error-prone 
reasoners.70 Unfortunately, each of the differences between 
Habermas's conception and his own also detracts from the attractive-
ness of Rawls's conception as model for blend objectivity. 
For a blend judgment to exert interpersonal validity - for an ap-
plied blend concept to exert reason-givingness interpersonally - it 
should live up to its social nature. 71 It should be world-guided by the 
appropriate social facts, it should reflect the intersubjective evaluations 
of merit implicit in the taxonomy of worth to which the blend concept 
belongs, and it should, as purported, respond to communally endorsed 
68. RAWLS, supra note 56, at 119 (footnote omitted). 
69. Id. 
70. Precisely what makes people "reasonable" or "unreasonable" is not entirely clear in 
Political Liberalism. Settling the question is not, however, important to my present purposes. 
71. For my defense of this claim, see infra text accompanying notes 74-77. 
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needs and interests. In controversial or novel cases, monological ap-
plication is unlikely to accomplish any of this. First, no single individ-
ual is likely to be aware of and sensitive to all the relevant 
conventional mores, cultural ideas, community values, and customs 
that world-guide a particular blend concept. Users of the concept are 
likely to vary in their knowledge of and sensitivity to such informa-
tion, depending upon how they are situated within the culture. Sec-
ond, when a single individual applies a blend concept, the application 
may well reflect personal preference, rather than an intersubjective 
evaluation of merit, and represent a response to personal needs and 
interests, rather than communally endorsed ones. In a controversial 
or novel case, it is improbable - although not impossible - that a 
single individual would have the cultural information and insight nec-
essary to apply a blend concept so that it lives up to its social nature. 
Dialogical application, on the other hand, stands a better chance of 
achieving this goal, thereby yielding blend judgments with interper-
sonal validity. 
A dialogue that produces at least some degree of actual agreement 
among those who may or may not be "reasonable," intelligent, consci-
entious, and correctly reasoning, but who will be affected by the.judg-
ment, is likely to do a better job of keeping blend judgments true to 
their social nature than a dialogue that produces a judgment only hy-
pothetically agreed upon by those with carefully circumscribed qualifi-
cations. Actual agreement among very different members of the 
culture keeps the judgment reflective of genuinely intersubjective eval-
uations of merit and responsive to communally endorsed needs and 
interests. Hypothetical agreement is all too easily presumed to exist 
and to extend to those who are quite different from one another. 
A defender of the Rawlsian conception might respond that, while 
it takes actual agreement to determine if a judgment is in fact objec-
tive, actual agreement is not what makes the judgment objective. 
Likewise, such a defender might acknowledge that a dialogical proce-
dure is useful for checking whether or not actual agreement obtains, 
yet it is not the use of such a procedure that makes the resulting judg-
ment objective. I reject these defenses of the Rawlsian conception as a 
model for blend objectivity because I believe that a conception of ob-
jectivity should tell us not only what makes a judgment objective, but 
also something serious about what it takes for a judgment to be objec-
tive. Even conceding the distinction between criteria for objectivity 
and techniques for ascertaining whether the criteria have been ful-
filled, we need a conception of objectivity that instructs us as to the 
latter as well as to the former. Insofar as the Rawlsian monological 
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moral-rationalist conception does not, it suffers from a defect similar 
to the Habermasian conception: it presents us with an ideal without 
telling us how to instantiate it. This undermines the practicality .the 
Rawlsian alternative seemed to offer. 
In any event, with regard to blend judgments, the distinction be-
tween criteria for objectivity and techniques for ascertaining whether 
the criteria have been fulfilled is problematic. Recall that, for a blend 
judgment to exert interpersonal validity, it must apply the blend con-
cept it contains so that it lives up to its social nature. This requires 
that the application reflect the appropriate intersubjective evaluations 
of merit and respond to communally endorsed needs and interests. 
Quite commonly, however, the evaluations of merit and needs and in-
terests addressed by a particular blend concept are tacit and unspeci-
fied among the users of that concept. Under these circumstances, 
satisfying the major criterion for interpersonal validity - having the 
application live up to the blend concept's social nature - will require 
a technique that generates or reinforces an intersubjective evaluation 
of merit and a communal endorsement of the underlying needs and 
interests. At this point, it becomes difficult to distinguish sharply be-
tween criteria for objectivity in blend judgments and techniques for 
ascertaining whether the criteria have been fulfilled because the pro-
cess of ascertaining fulfillment generates, at least partially, some of the 
criteria. This point emerges more clearly if we return to the question 
of whether it is possible for a single individual monologically applying 
a blend concept to arrive at an objective blend judgment, or whether 
this is simply impossible. In cases in which there is serious unclear-
ness about which evaluations of merit are intersubjective or which 
needs and interests are communally endorsed, or both, dialogue may 
be the only technique that can effectively resolve these matters. If this 
is true, in those cases it is not only improbable that an individual ap-
plying a blend concept monologically will arrive at an objective blend 
judgment, it is impossible. Again, in such cases, it becomes difficult to 
distinguish sharply between criteria for objectivity in blend judgments 
and techniques for ascertaining whether the criteria have been fulfilled 
because the process of ascertaining fulfillment at least partially gener-
ates some of the criteria. 
In the end, one might think a conception of objectivity should in-
form us not only about criteria for objectivity, but that it should also 
tell us something serious about which techniques would be best for 
ascertaining that these have been fulfilled, and that the distinction 
makes sense in the context of blend judgments. Or one might con-
clude that engaging in techniques to ascertain a judgment's objectivity 
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generates, at least partially, prerequisites to that judgment's objectiv-
ity. In either case, Rawls's version of a monological moral-rationalist 
conception is inadequate as a conception of objectivity suitable to 
blend judgments. 
B. The Blend Conception of Objectivity 
So far, in discussing both scientific and moral-rationalist concep-
tions of objectivity, I have chronicled their shortcomings as concep-
tions of objectivity suitable for blend judgments. 72 Yet the forgoing 
discussion yields affirmative information as well as negative. This is 
not surprising. All plausible conceptions of objectivity instantiate the 
same concept, in which the objective is that which possesses interper-
sonal validity by virtue of the reasons in its favor. Conceptions suita-
ble for different kinds of judgments vary, depending upon the context 
in which the judgments in question are made and why objectivity mat-
ters in that context. Up to this point, I have emphasized differences in 
context and in why objectivity matters, but, to the extent that there are 
similarities in these respects, we can borrow from alternative concep-
tions of objectivity in articulating one suitable for blend judgments. 
At the most general level, from the scientific and the moral-ration-
alist conceptions we learn about the structure of plausible conceptions 
of objectivity: they all account for the interpersonal validity of objec-
tive judgments in light of an important goal or interest shared by those 
party to the judgment. For scientific judgments, the goal is prediction 
and control of natural phenomena. For moral and political judg-
ments, the goal is - again, on some leading accounts - coordination 
of action in mutually acceptable ways, without resort to force or vio-
lence. For blend judgments, specifying a single major goal is more 
tricky. As noted before,73 we make blend judgments in a wide variety 
of contexts, such as law, etiquette, humor, and aesthetics. Different 
goals inform different contexts. In fact, even within a single context, 
such as law, different goals inform different subcontexts.74 Whatever 
the more specific goal apropos a particular context, however, sincerely 
made blend judgments are always meant to be reason-giving. In order 
to exert the interpersonal validity constitutive of objectivity, objective 
blend judgments must be interpersonally reason-giving. They stand a 
chance of this because of the social nature of blend concepts. To capi-
72. I have also avoided taking a stand as to their merits as conceptions of objectivity for 
scientific and moral judgments, as the case may be. 
73. See generally supra section I.B. 
74. See my comparison of judgments of negligence and judgments of what is speech, infra 
notes 80-93. 
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talize on this chance, a blend judgment must apply its blend concept 
so that it lives up to this nature, which requires that the application be 
world-guided by the appropriate social facts, that it reflect the inter-
subjective evaluations of merit implicit in the taxonomy of worth to 
which the blend concept belongs, and that it respond, as purported, to 
communally endorsed needs and interests. The second and third of 
these requirements dictate that the blend conception of objectivity 
conform to the structure of scientific and moral-rationalist concep-
tions. A prerequisite to objectivity in blend judgment is that there be 
some shared goals, values, and interests. 
Another lesson learned from the scientific and moral-rationalist 
conceptions of objectivity is that objective judgments, on whatever 
conception, are constrained judgments. Constraints upon judgment 
can take different forms. On the scientific-ontological conception, the 
natural world as it is - independent of scientists' beliefs, goals, 
desires, or representations of the facts - constrains which judgments 
count as objective. Only those that correspond to the world as it is 
qualify. On the scientific-methodological and the dialogical moral-
rationalist conceptions, procedures supply constraint. Only judgments 
that survive certain processes can count as objective. The method may 
be individualist (as in the individualist scientific-methodological con-
ception), collective (as in the socialist scientific-methodological con-
ception), dialogical (as in the dialogical moral-rationalist conception), 
or hypothetical (as in the monological moral-rationalist conception). 
Constraint guards against arbitrariness, whimsy, and idiosyncrasy; it 
ensures that not just any old judgment qualifies as objective. 
Which form constraint should take within a given conception of 
objectivity depends upon why objectivity matters in the context in 
question and what kinds of reasons can sustain interpersonal validity 
there. Proponents of different versions of scientific conceptions dis-
agree over what kinds of reasons can sustain interpersonal validity in 
the scientific contexts. Likewise, proponents of different versions of 
moral-rationalist conceptions disagree over what kinds of reasons can 
sustain interpersonal validity in moral and political contexts. Thus, 
proponents of rival versions of these conceptions of objectivity disa-
gree over what form constraints upon judgment should take. 
To sustain a blend judgment's interpersonal validity, reasons on its 
behalf must bear out the applied blend concept's social nature. Two 
types of constraint seem well suited to this task: dialogical methodol-
ogy for arriving at blend judgments and empirical constraints upon 
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blend judgments. As I argued previously,75 dialogical methods for 
making a blend judgment ensure that the applied blend concept lives 
up to its social nature and thus constrain which judgments will count 
as objective: some applications of a blend concept will not survive 
dialogical consideration. Empirical constraint of a certain kind also 
serves to ensure that an applied blend concept lives up to its social 
nature. In scientific conceptions of objectivity, empirical constraint 
takes the form of responsiveness to natural facts - either facts about 
the world as it is or facts about empirical appearances. In a blend 
conception of objectivity, empirical constraint comes in the form of 
responsiveness to the social facts that tend to world-guide blend con-
cepts. Requiring this responsiveness to empirically ascertainable so-
cial facts constrains the possible applications of a blend concept. 
According to both scientific-methodological and moral-rationalist 
conceptions, the reasons that sustain objective judgments are interper-
sonally available reasons. 76 On scientific-methodological conceptions, 
the reasons in favor of an objective judgment are interpersonally testa-
ble and interpersonally comprehensible. Judgments that rely solely on 
individual personal preferences, tastes, and inclinations are insuffi-
ciently public to qualify as objective. Moral-rationalist conceptions 
distinguish interpersonally available reasons from expressions of indi-
vidual personal preference, taste, and inclination, rejecting the per-
sonal in favor of the interpersonal, as bases for objective judgments. 
Even the Habermasian moral-rationalist conception - which autho-
rizes participants in argumentation to assert and express their individ-
ual desires, attitudes, and needs - would not count these as bases of 
objective judgment unless a judgment premised upon them received 
collective endorsement. 
Interpersonal availability of the reasons on behalf of a blend judg-
ment contributes directly to its interpersonal validity. The kind of in-
terpersonal validity that matters for blend judgments is interpersonal 
reason-givingness, which is far more sustainable when the reasons in 
favor of a particular application of a blend concept are interpersonally 
available, and when it is clear that these amount to more than expres-
sions of individual personal preference, taste, and inclination. 77 
75. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
76. Due to its epistemologically externalist slant, the scientific-ontological conception of ob-
jectivity does not require interpersonal availability of the reasons that sustain a scientific judg-
ment's interpersonal validity. This is because the scientific-ontological conception does not 
require that the reasons that sustain the judgment's interpersonal validity be available. 
77. Cass Sunstein notes that, historically speaking, American constitutional law has required 
"government to provide reasons that can be intelligible to different people operating from differ-
ent premises," as a means of ensuring impartiality. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONST!· 
TUTION 24 (1993). Sunstein is not concerned with the objectivity of blend judgments, but he 
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On all versions of the scientific and moral-rationalist conceptions 
of objectivity, convergence upon a judgment is a mark of its objectivity. 
On the scientific-ontological conception, convergence is a sign of re-
sponsiveness to the world as it is, independent of beliefs, goals, desires, 
or representations of the facts; on the scientific-methodological con-
ception, convergence demonstrates that public testing has vetted a 
judgment for too much responsiveness to any individual scientist's per-
sonal inclinations, values, and beliefs. The dialogical moral-rationalist 
conception regards convergence as constitutive of objectivity; the 
monological moral-rational conception treats potential, if not actual, 
convergence in the same way. The connection between convergence 
and interpersonal validity is fairly obvious: if a person endorses a 
judgment, she considers it valid; if everybody endorses that judgment, 
they all regard it as valid. If the judgment applies a blend concept -
which, as such, has a social nature - the judgment will be interper-
sonally valid in a strong sense. That is, it will be interpersonally rea-
son-giving, and those who have converged upon it will regard it as 
reason-giving for one another, as well as for themselves. 
Convergence simply suggests - rather than vouchsafes - objec-
tivity. Only when a convergence rests upon reasons is it a sign of gen-
uine objectivity. Furthermore, convergence upon a blend judgment 
signals objectivity only when genuinely shared goals, values, and inter-
ests inform the dialogical method by which the judgment was reached, 
and when that method is genuinely dialogical. Without confidence in 
these matters, we cannot be sure that a converged-upon blend judg-
ment has indeed applied a blend concept so that it lives up to its social 
nature. Disparities in power comprise one major obstacle both to the 
responsiveness to genuinely shared goals, values, and interests and to 
the unfolding of a genuinely dialogical method. Generally speaking, 
the greater the disparity in power between parties to a blend judgment, 
the more likely the judgment responds to goals, values, and interests 
shared only by the relatively empowered, and the more likely that 
their contributions control the dialogue through which the parties 
reach the judgment. A conception of objectivity suitable for blend 
judgments requires regulation of power disparities, which interfere with 
satisfying the other specifications for objectivity. 
On the basis of a consideration of the merits and demerits of scien-
tific and moral-rationalist conceptions of objectivity as models, we 
have arrived at a conception of objectivity suitable for blend judg-
emphasizes the relationship between interpersonally available reasons and impartiality in consti-
tutional law for much the same reasons that I include support by interpersonally available rea-
sons as one of the specifications for objectivity in blend judgments. 
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ments. We have seen how each specification of this conception an-
swers to the concept of objectivity: how each specification contributes 
to the interpersonal validity, sustained by reasons, of blend judgments 
in light of the social nature of the concepts they apply. The specifica-
tions, in sum, are: shared values, interests, and goals,· constraints upon 
judgment in the form of dialogical methodology and empirical con-
straints; interpersonally available reasons,· convergence,· and regulation 
of power disparities. A blend judgment is very likely to be objective, 
then, when it meets these specifications. 
C. The Blend Conception as Regulative Ideal 
Having a conception of objectivity suitable for blend judgments 
does not guarantee that any blend judgments can satisfy it. In fact, 
blend concepts have certain definitive traits that might appear to rule 
out the possibility of objectivity in applying such concepts. First, the 
application of a blend concept is neither algorithmic nor wholly deter-
minate. This means that there are genuinely close calls in application. 
In new or controversial situations it may be equally appropriate or 
inappropriate to apply a particular blend concept. One might think 
that, in such a situation, an objective application is out of the question, 
that the choice will come down to individual personal preference, de-
sire, or inclination. Second, the interventionist stance is appropriate 
for making blend judgments. When deciding whether to apply a par-
ticular blend concept, especially in new or controversial situations, it is 
proper to take into account both the effects of applying or not applying 
the blend concept and whether we want these effects. It may appear 
that interventionist stance licenses the inevitable reliance on individual 
preference, desire, or inclination in deciding close cases. Third, appro-
priate application of a blend concept is conventional, in that appropri-
ateness of application in new or controversial cases turns on whether 
the usual users of the concept accept it. Once more, this might suggest 
that blend judgments come down to particular individuals' personal 
preferences, desires, or inclinations. 
Each of the aforementioned traits raises the same potential road-
block to objectivity in blend judgment. Whether the roadblock can be 
forestalled is a question that cannot be answered a priori. We need to 
examine specific blend concepts and the judgments that apply them to 
see whether they manage to avoid or surmount the obstacle posed by 
intrusion of individual personal preference, taste, or inclination. Each 
of the specifications included in the blend conception of objectivity ad-
dresses this problem. Now we need to see whether there are any blend 
judgments that meet the specifications, and what aids or impedes them 
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in doing so. The blend conception of objectivity provides a regulative 
ideal for assessing the objectivity of blend judgments. 78 
I will take for an example the blend legal concept negligence and 
take us through a check for the objectivity of judgments of negligence. 
This will involve a review of some familiar features of common law 
method and apparatus, not because these features are little known, but 
to highlight the ways they contribute to or detract from the objectivity 
of judgments of negligence. 
The legal system uses a complex methodology to make judgments 
of negligence. A quick summary: The trial - the setting of the ini-
tial, specific judgment of negligence - operates according to extensive 
rules of procedure and evidence. Specific judgments, as well as the 
trial court's application of the rules of procedure and evidence, are 
subject to appellate review. At both the trial and appellate stages, 
judgments and procedural and evidentiary rulings are all informed by 
accepted textual authorities, such as precedent and the Restatement of 
Torts. 79 Throughout the process, the methodology relies on a sophisti-
cated division of labor. The attorneys for the parties to the case must 
present evidence and claims according to the rules. The trial judge 
must oversee this process and decide whether the case is close enough 
to present to the jury. She must also instruct the jury in how to apply 
the law of negligence to the evidence, claims, and arguments presented 
by the attorneys. The jury must attend to the evidence, claims, and 
arguments presented and to the instructions given by the judge. It 
must then deliberate and apply the law to the specific facts of the case 
at hand. The appellate court must review all of the trial judge's deci-
sions and decide whether the trial was satisfactory. Because this entire 
methodology is used repeatedly, the trial court judge has the addi-
tional task of attending to the appellate court's decisions to learn how 
to play her part; the appellate court must provide this type of instruc-
tion. With this apparatus fresh in our minds, we can turn now to 
whether and how it implements the specifications for objectivity in 
blend judgment. 
1. Shared Values, Interests, and Goals 
The evaluative points of negligence express the shared goals, val-
ues, and interests in the background of judgments of negligence. This 
78. Using the blend conception of objectivity to measure the objectivity of blend judgments 
will bear out the claim that the blend conception is a less ambitious regulative ideal than the 
Habermasian moral-rationalist conception - sufficiently less that it is not prey to the objections 
I lodged against the latter on grounds of its overambition. 
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 281-503 (1965). 
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prerequisite is met to the extent that shared views obtain within soci-
ety regarding the importance of allocating blame, deterring unaccept-
able risktaking, delineating what constitutes unacceptably dangerous 
behavior, serving corrective justice, and achieving judicial-administra-
tive efficiency when settling disputes in which one person harms an-
other and the parties are not in a contractual relationship. Laypeople, 
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars of all stripes regard each of these as 
important, worthwhile goals. There is, however, disagreement over 
the specifics of the relative importance of each of these points and 
about just what each one amounts to. For example, both among legal 
scholars and within the community, people disagree over whether de-
terring carelessness or achieving corrective justice more fundamentally 
informs negligence, or whether the latter is anything different from the 
former. 80 Other examples: popular-moral intuition varies as to what 
corrective justice involves, 81 and people disagree about how to define 
unreasonably dangerous risk. These sorts of disagreements preclude a 
complete sharing of the values, interests, and goals reflected in the 
evaluative points of negligence. To that extent, the objectivity of judg-
ments of negligence is curtailed. But these disagreements are "inter-
nal" debates, set against a background of agreement as to the range 
and type of goals importantly served by judgments of negligence. To 
this extent, the specification of shared values, interests, and goals is 
met, and judgments of negligence enjoy, in this respect, a significant 
degree of objectivity. 
2. Constraints upon Judgment 
The complex methodology of common law adjudication institu-
tionalizes a slew of constraints upon judgments of negligence. Some 
are a product of the common law's dialogical methodology, others a 
result of empirical constraints upon application of negligence, others 
more general byproducts of the common law system. I will consider 
these more general constraints first. 
The mechanisms of summary judgment, directed verdict, and judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict bound the jury verdict. These 
mechanisms - and, if they do not apply, the jury verdict itself - are 
80. Compare Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence. 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) with 
George P .. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972) a11d 
Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37 (1983). 
81. There is long-standing disagreement as to whether negligence or strict liability better 
serves the end of corrective justice. For judicial discussion of this issue, see Hammontree v. 
Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d 528 (1971). For scholarly debate, compare Richard A. Epstein, A 
Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) with Ernest J. Weinrib, Causatio11 a11d 
Wro11gdoi11g, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1987). 
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constrained by the evidence and the substantive law of negligence, 
about which the jury receives formal instruction from the trial judge. 
Established doctrine, in the form of previous appellate opinion, con-
strains the trial court, as does the prospect of potential appellate re-
view of the pending case. In turn, precedent and the Restatement 
constrain appellate review. 
So far, the constraints I have canvased are constraints internal to 
the legal system. They constrain legal and lay actors. A second set of 
constraints has a basis external to the legal system. These constraints 
owe to the relationship between the legal system and the larger society. 
Negligence, a legal concept applied by lay people (jurors) and accord-
ing to which the laypeople are supposed to act, must be intelligible to 
and resonate with laypeople. This means that the concept cannot be-
come excessively esoteric or technical, and this fact constrains the con-
cept's doctrinal development. In fact, the legal concept negligence, 
along with its subsidiary concepts of reasonable person and unreasona-
ble risk, has apparently been engineered out of vaguer social concepts 
of negligence and unreasonableness. The legal doctrine of negligence 
embeds the connection between the legal and social concepts. The rea-
sonable person is a composite of the community, albeit an idealized 
one; unreasonable risk is largely a matter of popular valuation. Thus, 
while legal mechanisms constrain jury judgments of negligence, social 
facts about reasonable behavior and risk constrain legal development 
of negligence and its subsidiary concepts. 
Current pressures on the common law system undermine the 
power of the forgoing constraints upon judgments of negligence. As 
the amount and complexity of litigation overwhelm judicial resources, 
judicial constraints suffer: trial judges increasingly promote settle-
ment, removing both community constraint represented by a jury ver-
dict and the trial court constraint represented by checks for summary 
judgment, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict; 
fewer cases reach appellate courts because even defendants whose con-
duct was incorrectly labeled negligent pay damages rather than fi-
nance a lengthy appeal. Even more specifically, legal constraint upon 
the jury's application of negligence suffers from jurors' inability to 
comprehend the trial judge's instructions to them. 82 Despite the pres-
82. This difficulty has been documented by Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making 
Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1306 (1979); see also AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDER-
STANDABLE 3-24 (1982); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205, 218-24. 
Sometimes, of course, juries choose to ignore even well-understood judicial instructions in 
favor of their own sense of fairness. If this practice is not widespread, it may not constitute a 
threat to constraint - quite the opposite. Such jury nullification imposes a constraint on the 
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sure these developments exert, though, they have not completely dis-
mantled the apparatus of common law adjudication, which continues 
to impose a degree of constraint upon judgments of negligence. 
3. Constraints: Dialogical Methodology 
The methodology by which judgments of negligence are made in-
stitutionalizes a series of dialogues, many of which relate to one an-
other. In other words, rather than all participants conversing with one 
another, each engages in one or more dialogues and witnesses several 
others. This produces a system of overlapping dialogues. 
Even before the trial commences, dialogue between attorneys, fu-
ture jurors, and the judge begins at voir dire. At trial, the plaintiff and 
the defendant engage in dialogue with one another, through their at-
torneys. All other participants witness this. The attorneys engage in 
dialogue with the trial court, much of which is witnessed by the parties 
and the jury. The trial court engages in dialogue with the jury, wit-
nessed by the parties and their attorneys. The jurors engage in dia-
logue with one another. On appeal, the attorneys engage in dialogue 
with the appellate court. The members of the appellate court engage 
in dialogue with one another - another dialogue that goes, in large 
part, unwitnessed. The appellate court engages in dialogue with the 
trial court. 
Finally, and more generally, a broader legal audience engages in 
dialogue with each other and with the courts, most often with appel-
late courts. Through means such as scholarly writing and the Restate-
ment, legal scholars and select practitioners converse with one 
another. Much of this conversation addresses the courts directly and 
the rest indirectly. 
All of these "dialogues" are formalized and resemble informal con-
versation only in broad outline. Nonetheless, each facilitates the ex-
change of ideas, arguments, information, and claims between all 
participants in the methodology of making judgments of negligence. 
For example, juries may never speak directly to judges or legal schol-
ars, but they convey, to some extent, their ideas through the verdicts 
they reach. Similarly, trial judges do not sit down for a heart-to-heart 
with appellate courts, but trial courts inform appellate courts of their 
understanding of the law of negligence, evidence, and procedure 
development of the law of negligence by signaling to courts the limits of popular·social tolerance 
for how negligence has been developed. Too frequent disregard of well-understood instructions 
would, however, cut sharply against the constraint attempted by judicial development of blend 
legal concepts, thereby cutting against the objectivity of blend legal judgments. 
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through the rulings they make, the jury instructions they give, and the 
opinions they occasionally write. 
A more serious impediment to meeting this specification arises 
from imperfect implementation of another specification: the regula-
tion of power disparities. 83 Socioeconomic factors such as wealth, sta-
tus, gender, and race result in overrepresentation of empowered 
groups and their interests in each of the forgoing dialogues. For exam-
ple, the practicing bar and the judiciary are largely white and male, 
and this affects their contributions to the dialogues in which they par-
ticipate. 84 Likewise, the effects of background socioeconomic factors 
affect dialogue in the jury room. 
All jurors do not contribute equally to the discussion. In theory, every 
juror is supposed to have an equal say in the deliberation and verdict, but 
in practice there are vast differences in how much jurors talk. . . . Re-
search studies show that the amount of group participation is related to 
the characteristics of the individuals themselves. Just as external status 
is reflected in the selection of the foreperson of the jury, it is reflected too 
in who participates the most during deliberation. On the average, men 
speak more than women .... Those with more education and higher-
status occupations also tend to dominate the discussion. Likewise, the 
foreperson, usually male, is regularly one of the most active 
participants. 85 
Sexism and snobbery hamper the injection of a Habermasian element 
- that is, free and unconstrained dialogue in the jury room - into 
dialogical common law methodology. Wealth influences that method-
ology from the outset of litigation, when financial resources affect po-
tential and actual litigants' decisions to bring suit, settle, or appeal, 
whatever the merits of their cases; wealth also influences litigants' abil-
ities to hire talented legal counsel. 
There are some countervailing factors that correct for some of 
these problems. Contingency fee arrangements in personal injury 
cases, for instance, introduce some litigants to the dialogue who would 
not otherwise be able to afford to participate. Representation of wo-
men, white and nonwhite, and men of color in both the bar and the 
judiciary has been steadily increasing. Even when power disparities do 
interfere with the extensiveness and authenticity of dialogue, dialogue 
still takes place and can achieve significant range and genuineness. 
83. For further discussion of that specification, see infra section II.B.7. 
84. See David Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1992) (urging the 
importance of increasing racial, gender, and socioeconomic diversity within the legal profession 
for the sake of increasing objectivity); Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 
(1990) (arguing that, because most members of the Supreme Court are white, the Court has 
trouble making countermajoritarian decisions). 
85. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 108 (1986); see also Ellsworth, 
supra note 82, at 213-14. 
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When it does, it performs its function of constraining judgment and 
thereby bestows some degree of objectivity. 
4. Empirical Constraints 
Empirical constraint enters into the methodology for making judg-
ments of negligence in two ways. First, the parties must present em-
pirical, if not scientific, evidence of the events giving rise to the claim. 
Second, correct application of reasonable person and unreasonable risk 
requires attention to empirically ascertainable, if social, facts regard-
ing matters such as typical degrees of caution in various circumstances 
and popular valuation of various activities. Of course, each of these 
empirical constraints operates imperfectly. Litigants do not always 
present their evidence systematically and coherently, and each side 
seeks to complicate the jury's understanding of the other's testimony; 
judges obtain some of their empirical information about social facts in 
a highly casual, and therefore potentially inaccurate, fashion. None-
theless, empirical information does call for or rule out certain applica-
tions of negligence, lending judgments that apply the concept a degree 
of objectivity in this regard. 
5. Interpersonally Available Reasons 
The methodology for making judgments of negligence demands in-
terpersonally available reasons on behalf of these judgments, as well as 
on behalf of the background guidelines for making them. Even judg-
ments and guidelines perhaps initially proffered on the basis of individ-
ual personal preference, taste, or inclination are vetted through a 
process that generates interpersonally available supporting reasons. A 
naked expression of individual preference, taste, or inclination does 
not count as a judgment of negligence. 
The jury's verdict or the trial judge's grant of summary judgment, 
directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict is supposed 
to rest on the evidence presented. This evidence, like that required in 
science, must be interpersonally accessible. Even when the fact 
claimed is highly private - such as the fact of an individual's pain and 
suffering - the party claiming the fact must present evidence accessi-
ble to the jurors, such as first-person description or expert testimony 
on external signs of the fact. If the plaintiff cannot supply sufficient 
interpersonally accessible evidence on behalf of his claims, the trial 
judge must grant summary judgment for the defendant, thus giving 
the plaintiff powerful incentive to produce such evidence. 
In the course of jury deliberations, jurors work to persuade one 
another of the verdict they favor. They use a variety of tactics, among 
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them the advancement of interpersonally available reasons in support 
of their preferred verdict. Even if some jurors become persuaded on 
other grounds, the jury verdict should, in principle, have the support 
of such reasons. That is, regardless of the actual reasons on which the 
jury's verdict rests, if the verdict could not possibly be based on rea-
sons interpersonally available to reasonable jurors, the trial court must 
grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict predicated on the lack of 
such support. 
Appellate opinions collect and relate interpersonally available rea-
sons on behalf of the decisions they announce. They do not present 
the decisions as expressions of the personal tastes, preferences, and 
inclinations of the appellate judges. Instead, appellate opinions pro-
vide lower courts with reasons for the decision, thereby also providing 
reasons to support future trial court decisions. 
The forgoing processes for ensuring that interpersonally available 
reasons underpin judgments of negligence work imperfectly, to be 
sure. The processes themselves are not always followed, as is evi-
denced by the increasing use of unpublished appellate opinions. 86 De-
viations like this one undercut the impetus to generate interpersonal 
reasons for the guidelines for applying negligence. Even when inter-
personal reasons are generated, limitations on the diversity of the par-
ticipants in the processes cut against the interpersonality of the 
reasons in support of the resulting judgments. Still, as with the other 
specifications, although common law methodology may implement 
this one imperfectly, it does implement it and thereby achieves a mea-
sure of objectivity in judgments of negligence. 
6. Convergence 
Just as common law methodology institutionalizes its dialogical di-
mension in the form of overlapping dialogues, it incorporates conver-
gence in a hierarchy of mutually supporting convergences. Rather 
than every participant in the methodology converging on each specific 
judgment of negligence or each doctrinal guideline, participants join in 
different convergences at different points in the methodology. These 
convergences reinforce one another. 
The jury verdict represents the jurors' convergence upon a specific 
judgment of negligence. When the trial judge and the appellate court 
let a jury verdict stand, they reinforce the jurors' convergence. Like-
wise, a trial outcome that withstands appeal reflects convergence of 
86. Cf. Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and 
Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989) (criti-
cizing the use of unpublished opinions). 
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the trial court and the appellate court upon the guidelines for making 
judgments of negligence. Judicial convergence is also manifested by a 
trial judge's reliance upon appellate precedent when deciding whether 
to take a case from the jury's hands or how to instruct the jury. Prece-
dent represents appellate convergence on these issues. Finally, the 
Restatement and the courts' use of it reflect two other levels of conver-
gence. The provisions of the Restatement embody convergence among 
courts, scholars, and practitioners. Judicial reliance on these provi-
sions represents another convergence upon the principles they express, 
one that reinforces the prior convergence presented in the Restatement 
itself. 
As I noted in my previous discussion of convergence as a mark of 
objectivity, convergence only suggests, not guarantees, objectivity.87 
To the extent that a convergence seems to rest on something other 
than interpersonally available reasons, fails to reflect genuinely shared 
goals, values, and interests, or is not the product of genuine dialogue, 
it fails to vouchsafe objectivity. I have already indicated when and 
where we have reason to question whether a converged-upon judg-
ment of negligence rests on interpersonally available reasons, whether 
it reflects genuinely shared goals, values, and interests, and whether it 
is the product of genuine dialogue. Our level of doubt about these 
matters is the measure of how much we should discount convergence 
as a mark of the objectivity of any particular judgment of negligence. 
Short of complete skepticism about them, however, convergence re-
mains something of an indicator of a judgment's objectivity. 
7. Regulation of Power Disparities 
In discussing the previous specifications I have already canvased 
the failure of common law apparatus to regulate adequately power dis-
parities due to background socioeconomic factors. Here, I tum to 
power disparities that the common law apparatus more successfully 
regulates. These are power disparities among the participants due to 
the different roles the apparatus assigns them. Although the appara-
tus allocates power to certain participants - lawyers, judges, and ju-
ries each have powers specific to their roles - it also regulates the 
effects of this allocation through a careful division oflabor. For exam-
ple, although courts and other legal specialists enjoy tremendous 
power by virtue of their control over doctrinal development of the 
concept negligence, this power is mitigated by the jury's direct com-
mand over specific judgments of negligence. In tum, legal mecha-
87. See supra text following note 77. 
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nisms - such as summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict - mitigate the jury's power. These mech-
anisms, however, operate according to how reasonable juries can be 
expected to reach a verdict, thus reintroducing an element of commu-
nity control over legal apparatus. Likewise, although trial courts en-
joy great power over the actual trials of negligence causes of action, 
appellate power to review trial court behavior limits trial court power. 
In tum, the need for appellate courts to make their reasoning accessi-
ble and persuasive to lower courts curtails the appellate power of 
review. 
In reviewing how common law apparatus implements the regula-
tive ideal provided by the blend conception of objectivity and how 
judgments of negligence fare according to that ideal, we see that judg-
ments of negligence enjoy some degree of objectivity, although they do 
not achieve anything like total objectivity. We also see the blend con-
ception's regulative power in pinpointing which features of common 
law adjudication foster objectivity, and which impede it. To reinforce 
the point that judgments of negligence enjoy a significant degree of 
objectivity and to appreciate fully the regulative power of the blend 
conception of objectivity, it helps to see how another kind of legal 
judgment fares when we measure its objectivity against the blend 
conception. 
Consider judgments of when, for First Amendment purposes, a 
form of expression is speech. Put briefly, my claims are: first, that 
speech, as it appears in the law of the First Amendment, is a blend 
concept - and therefore judgments of speech are blend legal judg-
ments - and, second, that there are both methodological and societal 
obstacles to the objectivity of judgments of speech. 
One of the judgments that must be made when deciding whether 
an activity merits First Amendment protection is whether the activity 
is speech. This question is almost exclusively a question of law, rather 
than fact. Courts, not juries, decide it. 88 The textual basis for decid-
ing the question consists of Supreme Court precedent - there is no 
Restatement or analog to a Restatement in the area of First Amend-
ment law.89 
88. For discussion of the role of appellate courts in First Amendment adjudication, see Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), in which the Court reiterates the 
principle that, in First Amendment cases, appellate courts have the authority and obligation to 
review and decide de novo issues oflaw and of fact, and even "mixed" issues oflaw and fact. 466 
U.S. at 501. 
89. There are influential treatises, written by single individuals. See, e.g., LAWRENCE TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 12-1 to -39 (2d ed. 1988). But, while Tribe's work may 
be steeped in prior convergences regarding constitutional law, a treatise like his reflects a single 
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Speech itself is a closet blend concept. It is often taken to be much 
like water or proton: not a member of an evaluative taxonomy; lacking 
an evaluative point arising from human needs, interests, and desires; 
world-guided and not reason-giving; neither appropriately nor actually 
applied from an interventionist stance. None of these characteriza-
tions, however, is accurate. Speech clearly delineates one category in a 
classificatory scheme of worth. Its application bestows protection 
upon the activity in question, on grounds of the activity's worth to 
self-expression, or, if one takes a different view of the interests ad-
dressed by First Amendment doctrine's evaluative taxonomy, to the 
ongoing pursuit of the best ideas. Other categories in the taxonomy 
include commercial speech, fighting words, libel, and obscenity. Activi-
ties to which these concepts apply all receive, in varying degrees, less 
protection than activities to which speech applies. The evaluative 
points of the First Amendment taxonomy of worth include increasing 
knowledge, ensuring political liberty, and promoting self-expression. 
What happens when people disagree over whether speech applies evi-
dences the reason-givingness of the concept: they debate whether state 
interference with the activity in question threatens the evaluative 
point(s) of the First Amendment taxonomy of worth. In other words, 
they do not simply look for further facts to settle the matter; they seek 
to answer a normative question. Once a novel question of application 
is decided, the concept's world-guidedness is altered; in this way 
speech's reason-givingness informs its world-guidedness. So, once the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided that labor picketing90 or wearing arm-
bands91 was speech, the concept's world-guidedness no longer re-
quired that an activity be verbal for it to qualify as speech. Courts 
commonly apply speech from an interventionist stance, which suggests 
that this stance is appropriate for its application. In deciding whether 
certain activities count as speech, courts consider whether we want to 
tolerate or encourage them. If so, this weighs in favor of applying the 
concept. 
Thus, speech belongs to an evaluative taxonomy, informed by eval-
uative points; it is simultaneously world-guided and reason-giving, and 
its reason-givingness informs its world guidedness; and it is often and 
appropriately applied from an interventionist stance. Speech is, in 
short, a blend legal concept. But blend judgments of what is speech 
appear to many to be less objective than blend judgments of negli-
individual's (the author's) views to a greater degree than does a collectively compiled work like a 
Restatement. 
90. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
91. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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gence. 92 This appearance makes sense, according to the blend concep-
tion of objectivity: according to that conception, judgments of what is 
speech are less objective. 
Judgments of speech are relatively unconstrained compared to 
judgments of negligence. Neither the lay community, through the 
jury, nor the broader legal community, through a Restatement, checks 
judicial development and application of speech. Likewise, jurors and 
legal specialists are largely absent from whatever convergences exist 
upon speech's application and development, reducing the overall levels 
of convergence. So too there are fewer dialogues, given the absence of 
jury deliberation and colloquy amongst specialists devising a Restate-
ment; accordingly, fewer reasons on behalf of application and guide-
lines for application are generated. In the absence of these conditions 
or anything equivalent to them, the objectivity of judgments of speech 
is suspect. We have reason to doubt whether they are - or are seri-
ously - interpersonally valid by virtue of the reasons in their favor. 
Perhaps changes in methodology could eliminate or reduce each of 
the forgoing impediments to the objectivity of judgments of what is 
speech. A methodology revised to more reliably generate objectivity 
need not resemble common law methodology in all its particulars, but 
it should meet the specifications laid down by the blend conception of 
objectivity. Regardless, however, of how we might revise our method 
for making judgments of speech, a more intractable impediment to 
their objectivity lies in the way. In a pluralistic, heterogeneous society 
such as ours, people disagree sharply over the needs, interests, and 
desires that give rise to the evaluative points of the First Amendment 
taxonomy of worth. They also disagree sharply over the importance 
or strength of these needs, interests, and desires compared to rival 
ones. Many of these disagreements arise from large-scale political and 
structural confiicts.93 This means that the basic prerequisite to objec-
tivity in blend judgment is far from met. A serious question emerges: 
with the prerequisite so unsatisfied, could anything like the full-blown 
common law methodology be used for judgments of what is speech? 
92. Consider attacks upon the characterization of pornography as speech for First Amend-
ment purposes. See, e.g., Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, 
and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. l, 8-9 (1985); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, 
Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16-17, 50-52 (1985). 
93. Consider, for example, the heated disagreement about government regulation of pornog-
raphy. One take on the dispute suggests that feminists who favor regulation and ardent defend-
ers of the First Amendment rights of pornographers - a group that includes some feminists -
disagree not only about what counts as speech and what the worth of speech is, but also perceive 
women's (and men's) interests and conditions very differently. Their disagreements on the latter 
issues indicate the kind of large-scale political and structural clashes that color the fiercest First 
Amendment battles. 
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Could a more diverse array of participants have meaningful dialogue 
on the subject and could they converge regularly on particular deci-
sions? On the other hand, without widespread participation in the 
process of developing and applying speech, arriving at relevant shared 
needs, interests, and desires becomes less likely. Common law meth-
odology reinforces the conditions that satisfy the prerequisite to objec-
tivity. With regard to judgments of what is speech, more refined 
questions to ask are whether there are sufficiently shared needs, inter-
ests, and desires for something like common law methodology to get 
off the ground, and whether, once off the ground, the methodology 
would foster further sharing of needs, interests, and desires. 
We need not look to constitutional law for examples of blend judg-
ments whose objectivity is more contentious than the objectivity of 
judgments of negligence. Consider judgments of rape. Rape is clearly 
a blend concept - but one about which there is deep dispute as to the 
needs and interests to which it responds. While some think rape re-
sponds only to women's interest in being safe from violently imposed 
sexual intercourse,94 others think it responds to women's interest in 
noncoercive sexual intercourse, including being free from nonviolent 
coercive intercourse.95 This depiction of the debate undoubtedly over-
simplifies it. The point is that the very deep dispute over the needs 
and interests to which rape responds sharply limits the concept's ca-
pacity to figure in objective judgments. Judgments of rape are made 
absent a background of shared values, interests, and goals. This in 
itself curtails their capacity for objectivity. Furthermore, without 
such a background, there is fundamental disagreement about the 
meaning and relevance of the empirical information usually consid-
ered when judging rape. If she did not say "no," but she did not say 
"yes," what does this mean and how does it bear on the judgment? If 
he did not hit her but he got her stoned, what does this mean and how 
does it bear on the judgment? Questions like these are intractable in 
the face of deep division over the needs, interests, and values that in-
form rape. Without settling such questions, empirical information 
cannot constrain effectively the application of rape, casting another 
doubt on the objectivity of such judgments. 
When we compare judgments of negligence, judgments of speech, 
and judgments of rape, we discover that the potential for objectivity 
varies between different types of blend legal judgments. It is, however, 
94. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1346-48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); KATIE 
ROJPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 51-84 (1993). 
95. In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992); Lani A. Remick, Read Her Lips: An Argumelll 
for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1103 (1993). 
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unlikely that current limits upon potential objectivity are conceptual 
or a priori. Most ambitiously, we should work to reduce and ulti-
mately to eliminate racism, sexism, and snobbery. This would facili-
tate the formation of shared goals, needs, and interests to undergird 
the objectivity of judgments of negligence, speech, and rape. 
Less grandly - and, alas, more realistically - we could make 
methodological changes that would foster objectivity. For making 
judgments of speech, we could design a methodology that would in-
clude a wider array of participants. When it comes to judgments of 
negligence, we could fine tune common law methodology. For in-
stance, we could revamp jury instructions, increasing their compre-
hensibility and thereby enhancing constraint upon jury verdicts.96 Or 
we could have the court appoint the foreperson of the jury, assigning 
the role to someone from a group whose members normally do not 
participate much in deliberation; alternatively, and less intrusively, we 
could instruct juries to select their forepersons randomly, so that the 
role would not fall disproportionately to well-off white men. We could 
concentrate upon increasing the ranks of nonwhite and (white and 
nonwhite) female appellate judges, thus enhancing the interpersonality 
of the reasons proffered by appellate courts on behalf of their 
decisions. 
I could extend this list of recommendations, but my aim here is 
illustrative, not exhaustive. My sample recommendations show the 
critical power afforded by the blend conception of objectivity. That 
conception provides leverage with which to reshape how we make 
blend legal judgments and a vantage point from which to advance 
more sweeping socioeconomic revisions. In my view, this proves the 
advantages of developing a conception of objectivity suitable for blend 
judgments rather than trashing aspirations to objectivity - and the 
idea of objectivity itself - altogether. 
The conception of objectivity that I have articulated functions as a 
regulative ideal, one with advantages over both the Habermasian and 
the Rawlsian moral-rationalist conceptions. Unlike the Habermasian 
moral-rationalist conception, which I criticized for its overambition, 
blend objectivity provides a pragmatic regulative ideal. Unlike those 
of the Habermasian conception, its specifications can be implemented 
in the real world because each of its specifications can be met substan-
96. Psycholinguists and lawyers have already drafted jury instructions on negligence that test 
juries have proven to understand better than traditional instructions. Charrow & Charrow, 
supra note 82, at 1348-51. ELWORK ET AL., supra note 82, at 12-17, have demonstrated that 
jurors who received traditional Michigan jury instructions did no better at reaching correct ver-
dicts than jurors who received no instructions at all, whereas jurors who received instructions 
rewritten for better comprehension performed substantially better than the uninstructed group. 
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tially without excessively wide participation or totally complete agree-
ment. In contrast to the Rawlsian conception,97 the blend conception 
of objectivity is not a hypothetical criterion for objectivity, but a prac-
tically oriented heuristic. It directs us as to what we should do to 
achieve objectivity, rather than allowing each of us to rest content 
with the calculation that we probably have done so by satisfying a 
counterfactual test. Moreover, because the blend conception is neither 
monological nor does it limit participation to those who are "reason-
able," instantiating its specifications is more likely to yield blend judg-
ments guided by appropriate social facts and responsive to 
intersubjective evaluations of merit than would satisfying the Rawlsian 
criterion. 
Whereas the Habermasian conception requires that all affected by 
a judgment participate in making it, freely and fully introducing any 
and all assertions and expressions of attitude, desire, and need, blend 
objectivity does not demand this sort of ideal speech situation, requir-
ing instead only some kind of dialogical constraint upon judgment. 
Consider how common law methodology implements this specifica-
tion. Common law methodology excludes the direct participation of 
any number of people affected by particular judgments of negligence. 
Unless called as witnesses, friends and family members of the parties 
do not participate in the trial; nor do those who will have to rethink 
and modify their behavior in light of the judgment; nor do appellate 
judges who may have to review the judgment. Even those who partici-
pate in the trial do not all participate in deliberation and decision of 
the verdict, the specific judgment of negligence; only jurors engage in 
that activity. 
Despite these restrictions, however, common law methodology 
also displays respect for the importance of participation to objectivity 
through its dependence upon the indirect participation of a large 
number of people. The methodology relies heavily upon sources such 
as precedent and the Restatement, bodies of material that only develop 
through the participation of large numbers of people, over many years. 
In addition, in principle the methodology should provide many oppor-
tunities for all to participate directly, either as parties, jurors, lawyers, 
or judges. Yet, by limiting direct participation in particular judgments 
of negligence, common law methodology ensures that disputes will be 
adjudicated and specific judgments made. 
Common law methodology restrains opportunity for assertion and 
expression according to role. The methodology assigns each partici-
97. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71. 
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pant a role, and they may assert or express only role-appropriate 
claims at role-appropriate times. The parties and their attorneys may 
not say whatever they want at any given moment during a trial. By 
and large, attorneys speak on behalf of their clients, except when the 
client takes the stand. Attorneys speak during the periods allotted to 
them - even their opportunities to object repeatedly are governed by 
the trial judge. Although the judge regulates when others may or 
must speak, even she cannot permissibly say anything she wants dur-
ing the course of a trial. Both implicit norms and explicit sanctions 
confine her to remarks suitable to her role as judge. If her remarks 
veer too wildly from role-appropriateness, the proceedings can even be 
declared a mistrial. Restraining expression and assertion has obvious 
practical advantage - trials must end. If every participant said every-
thing, or even every relevant thing, that occurred to him, trials never 
would end. In addition, restricting speech according to role reinforces 
the division of labor built into legal methodology. This division of 
labor produces the layers of constraint upon judgments of negligence 
and regulates the effects of power disparities among the participants, 
so its maintenance is vital. 
Layered constraints pragmatically answer to real-world impera-
tives. Although each of the participants in the methodology operates 
according to different constraints, all contributions operate according 
to some constraint. Lay participants are constrained by legal appara-
tus; attorneys are constrained by trial judges, who are, in tum, con-
strained by appellate courts; legal specialists of all kinds are 
constrained by the need for community access to legal doctrine. This 
system of interlocking constraint responds to the need to situate differ-
ent participants differently within the methodology, thereby rendering 
different sorts of constraints appropriate for different actors. 
In a similar move to practicality, rather than having all partici-
pants engage in dialogue with one another simultaneously - a disor-
derly, time-consuming prospect - common law methodology enacts a 
series of dialogues, most witnessed by participants not currently en-
gaged. Jury deliberations go unwitnessed, making it possible for them 
to serve as a pragmatic stand-in for a Habermasian ideal speech situa-
tion. In the privacy of the jury room, jurors have relatively extensive 
freedom, compared to the other participants during the rest of the 
trial, to express and assert a wide range of views and claims.98 For six 
98. The vast majority of jurisdictions have made it illegal to record jury deliberations, largely 
in response to social scientists who recorded, with the permission of the trial judge and parties' 
counsel, five civil cases in Kansas during the 1950s. The recording provoked a huge outcry 
among both lawyers and laypeople. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 85, at 99. The public and legal 
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or twelve people with a common task, relatively unrestrained assertion 
and expression is a workable enterprise. 
As with layered constraints and serial dialogues, common law 
methodology implements the specification of convergence in a highly 
focused way. Rather than seek widespread convergence specifically on 
particular judgments of negligence, the methodology aims for small-
scale convergence on particular judgments, backed by wide-scale con-
vergence on the way in which juries should apply negligence. A jury 
verdict that withstands appellate review, with the review itself based 
upon long-standing precedent regarding application of negligence, rep-
resents this kind of backed convergence. Even an unappealedjury ver-
dict presumptively enjoys wide-scale background backing. Insofar as 
the losing party's decision not to appeal rests on an accurate estima-
tion that the judgment would survive appeal, the trial verdict con-
forms to converged-upon guidelines for the application of negligence. 
Finally, consider how common law methodology specifies support 
by interpersonally available reasons. The mechanisms that generate 
interpersonally available reasons in support of judgments of negligence 
or guidelines for these judgments do not guarantee that these reasons 
are indeed the ones that persuaded the participants. Providing this 
kind of guarantee, however, is a highly unrealistic aspiration. It would 
take a kind of psychological insight hard to imagine possible. So, 
again, common law methodology adopts a pragmatic solution, requir-
ing participants to generate or look to interpersonally available rea-
sons, even if these reasons are not actually the basis of the participants' 
decisions. This means that there must be interpersonally available rea-
sons supporting the decisions, even if these reasons are not the partici-
pants'. The methodology demands that participants generate 
interpersonally available reasons on behalf of their decisions: appel-
late courts must publish opinions articulating them; trial courts must 
think about them when deciding whether to grant summary judgment, 
directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and jurors 
must persuade one another in collective deliberation. The decisions of 
each decisionmaking participant -jury, trial judge, appellate court -
receive review from another participant: the trial court reviews the 
jury's decisions; the appellate court reviews the trial court's; and the 
legal community as whole examines the appellate court's. Having to 
think of interpersonally available reasons on behalf of one's decisions 
and knowing that these decisions must survive the scrutiny of others 
reactions attest to broad social support for the ideal of the juryroom as a locale for freewheeling, 
unconstrained debate and discussion. 
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make it more likely that interpersonally available reasons will in fact 
form at least part of the basis for one's decisions. 
Bounded participation, restrained expression and assertion, inter-
locking constraints, layered dialogues, articulated and articulable in-
terpersonal reasons, small-scale convergence backed· by wide-scale 
convergence: each of these features of the common law version of 
blend objectivity illustrates the way the blend conception answers to 
the demands of the real world, rather than to an obviously unattaina-
ble ideal. Common law methodology is only one possible instantiation 
of the blend conception of objectivity. Any instantiation should, how-
ever, capitalize on the blend conception's pragmatic orientation. 
III. WHAT THE BLEND CONCEPTION OF OBJECTIVITY OFFERS TO 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Thus far, I have been demonstrating the advantages of the blend 
conception of objectivity in formulating a practice for making these 
judgments. The blend conception of objectivity also enjoys advantages 
in the context of scholarly debates over objectivity in law. Most im-
portantly, perhaps, the blend conception provides a vantage point 
from which to diagnose and understand a variety of disagreements 
over objectivity in law. The blend conception also supplies a source of 
leverage for penetrating criticism of certain classes of legal judgments 
precisely because it carefully delineates what objectivity requires in 
this context, rather than completely dismissing the possibility of objec-
tivity, as certain critics do. Finally, the blend conception enables us to 
sidestep some issues that have sharply divided defenders and critics of 
law's objectivity, matters that the blend conception renders largely 
irrelevant. 
Much of the debate over objectivity in law has focused on the ob-
jectivity of appellate judicial decisions. Both critics and defenders 
center on these.99 The focus of my inquiry, on the other hand, has 
99. Critics who have concentrated on appellate judicial opinions include Felix Cohen, 
Duncan Kennedy, Gary Peller, and Mark Tushnet. See Cohen, supra note 12; Kennedy, supra 
note 5; Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561, 606-17 (1988); 
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral 
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983). Ronald Dworkin, Stanley Fish, and Owen Fiss are 
among the defenders who have done the same. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 4; DWOR-
KIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 4, at 119-77; STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: 
CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 1-33, 
87-102, 120-40, 372-98 (1989); Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985); 
Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982). 
Actually, to call Dworkin a "defender" of the concept of objectivity is a bit simplistic. Dwor-
kin "defends" an oddly deflationary version of the concept. He claims, "[w]e use the language of 
objectivity, not to give our ordinary moral or interpretive claims a bizarre metaphysical base, but 
to repeat them, perhaps in a more precise way, to emphasize or qualify their content." DwoR-
1248 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:1187 
been the objectivity of specific legal judgments, judgments that apply 
blend legal concepts. In my view, appellate courts make only a small 
contribution to whatever objectivity any given blend legal judgment 
achieves. The inconclusiveness of the debate over objectivity in law 
owes, in my opinion, to the fact that both critics and defenders are 
looking for objectivity in the wrong place. Rather than examining the 
entire common law apparatus, scholars have generally checked only a 
small pocket, the appellate court opinion. It makes sense that some 
scholars then insist that law is objective, while others insist that it is 
not: appellate court opinions play a part, but only a part, in imple-
menting the specifications of the conception of objectivity suitable for 
blend legal judgments. 
This observation makes sense of Duncan Kennedy's ambivalence 
about objectivity in law. In his consideration of appellate court judg-
ing, Kennedy cannot resist the intuition that it is objective, yet he con-
tinually emphasizes that its objectivity is only apparent or 
"pseudo."100 .Kennedy acknowledges that his intuition stems from the 
recognition that appellate judging is somewhat constrained, somewhat 
dialogical, and somewhat a matter of giving interpersonally available 
reasons. 101 According to the blend conception, this means that appel-
late judgments meet, at least partially, some of the specifications for 
objectivity, thus making sense of Kennedy's feeling that appellate 
judgments are somewhat objective. Appellate judgments do not, how-
ever, meet all of the specifications for blend objectivity, nor do they, in 
isolation from the rest of the common law apparatus, fully contribute 
to satisfying the ones they do help to meet, perhaps explaining Ken-
nedy's reluctance straightforwardly to count them objective. 
Recognizing that appellate judicial decision plays a part - but 
only a part - in making blend legal judgments objective (to whatever 
degree they are objective) also helps make sense of why Stanley Fish's 
views on the objectivity of appellate judicial interpretation are simulta-
neously satisfying and dissatisfying. Fish continually insists that ap-
pellate judicial interpretation is objective because it is constrained -
constrained by the practice of judging itself. 102 Again, as in the case of 
Kennedy, the blend conception justifies the significance Fish accords 
KlN, EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 81. While I share Dworkin's opinion that talk of objectivity need 
not be talk of metaphysics, I think that talk of objectivity amounts to more than repetition of 
claims made without such talk. Nonetheless, whatever his deflationism, Dworkin clearly thinks 
there is something to the concept of objectivity, and he argues strenuously that judicial decision· 
making is capable of objectivity. 
100. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 522. 
101. Id. at 520-22, 539. 
102. See, e.g., FISH, supra note 99, at 92-94, 109-10. 
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to constraint: to the extent that appellate court blend judgments are 
constrained, they achieve a measure of objectivity. But the practice of 
judging, standing alone, is not really a very serious constraint, or so 
many have worried.103 If Fish were to broaden his scope, however, he 
would see that appellate court blend judgments are constrained by 
more than the "practice of judging." They answer to all of the con-
straints I discussed previously.104 
A pair of the intuitions that seems to drive some detractors of law's 
objectivity is that the law is "political," and that being "political" in-
terferes with objectivity.105 The blend conception of objectivity turns 
these intuitions on their heads by incorporating a political dimension 
into the demands of objectivity. On the blend conception objectivity is 
- to a degree - a political matter, so being political does not pre-
clude legal judgments from being objective. Two specifications for 
blend objectivity especially raise issues that would generally be re-
garded as "political." Specifying shared values, interests, and goals 
raises questions of which values, goals, and interests, if any, are 
shared; why certain ones are not; and how to bring any shared ones 
into being. Requiring regulation of power disparities raises questions 
about who is empowered relative to whom, and about when relative 
empowerment distorts dialogue, interferes with interpersonal availa-
bility of reasons, or renders convergence suspect. Checking to see 
whether and to what extent a blend legal judgment meets the specifica-
tions of shared values, interests, and goals and regulation of power 
disparities requires consideration of these questions. Inquiring into 
the objectivity of a blend legal judgment, then, inevitably calls for 
political inquiry. Failure to satisfy the specifications raises further 
political questions, such as what social, economic, and political ar-
rangements would allow for the development of shared values, inter-
ests, and goals and redistribute power conducively for objectivity. 
Overlap between politics and objectivity in blend legal judgment is 
inevitable, although this does not obviate sensible, workable distinc-
103. American legal realists, critical legal studies scholars, and liberal legal scholars have all 
been concerned that an individual judge's personal preferences, goals, and values can skew her 
appellate decisionmaking. See, e.g., DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 228-38 (arguing that, 
when engaged in literary or judicial interpretation, one must be on guard against accepting 
purely "subjective" interpretations); Cohen, supra note 12, at 810-12 (arguing that courts write 
in terms that are useful only for expressing and inducing emotions and attitudes); Duncan Ken-
nedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 354-56, 385-87 (1973) (arguing that judges' "val-
ues, ends, goals, interests, [and] desires" necessarily enter into judicial decisionmaking, given 
logical impossibility of judge as (neutral) "rule applier"). 
104. See supra text accompanying notes 81-86. 
105. James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 
133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 687-91, 706-08 (1985); Peller, supra note 99, at 561-72, 606-17. 
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tions between law and politics. Political matters bear on the objectiv-
ity of blend legal judgments, but they remain recognizably political. 
They become particularly important to blend legal judgments when 
the state of politics interferes with satisfying the specifications for 
blend objectivity. Failure or inability to meet these specifications pro-
vides good reason for political change: objectivity in legal judgment 
requires it. 106 
Thus, the blend conception of objectivity answers to concerns 
raised by feminist and critical race scholars.107 It can provide critical 
leverage against legal judgments that have systematically oppressed or 
ignored the interests of those excluded from political and legal partici-
pation and power by revealing how this exclusion can undermine the 
objectivity of those judgments. Returning to the example of judg-
ments of rape, 108 here is a rough sketch of how the blend conception of 
objectivity provides resources for expressing feminist concern about 
such judgments: Insofar as men continue to enjoy greater economic, 
political, and social power than women, the values, interests, and goals 
that inform rape are unlikely to be widely or deeply shared, either 
between men and women or between members of the same sex. More-
over, these gendered power disparities also make it difficult for people 
to develop shared values, interests, and goals relevant to rape, by mak-
ing it extremely difficult for people even to have fruitful conversation 
about the values, interests, and goals that do or should animate the 
concept, let alone come to agreement on these. Lack of shared values, 
interests, and goals and power disparity between men and women raise 
concern over the validity of judgments of rape at a more specific level, 
however. These problems interfere with the dialogic8:1 methodology 
conducted in the court system. That methodology is meant to contrib-
ute to blend objectivity by providing people from different perspectives 
similar opportunity to participate in each element of the process by 
which a blend legal judgment is reached. If, however, men still domi-
nate the judiciary, the bar, and jury deliberations, this raises doubts as 
to whether the dialogical method can perform effectively in the pro-
cess of making judgments of rape. 
According to the blend conception, then, we have several reasons 
106. This conclusion should be quite congenial to those who condemn law for being "polit-
ical" and, so, not objective. They tend to seek progressive political change; blend objectivity 
supplies grounds for such change. Both Peller and Boyle advocate progressive political change. 
See Boyle, supra note 105, at 778-80; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public 
Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 709, 748, 
779-91 (1991); Peller, supra note 99. 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5. 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95. 
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to doubt that judgments of rape enjoy a significant degree of objectiv-
ity. It is especially useful to be able to place feminist concerns about 
judgments of rape in the context of a concern for their objectivity be-
cause those who resist feminism may nonetheless value objectivity. 
Demonstrating what objectivity in legal judgment requires provides 
impetus for political change that might otherwise meet with resistance. 
Scholars arguing for such change should embrace the blend concep-
tion of objectivity. 
Much previous argument over the objectivity of law has centered 
on whether there is a single right or one best answer in hard legal 
cases, or whether any legal case really has only a single answer. 109 
The blend conception obviates the need to debate these questions. 
When we tum to the question of whether, in any particular negligence 
action, there is one best, or only one possible, blend legal judgment, we 
see that the objectivity of the judgment does not depend on the an-
swer. The blend conception requires that, for a judgment to be objec-
tive, it be constrained through dialogical method and empirical 
constraints, and supported by interpersonally available reasons. It is 
possible in some negligence actions that both an application of the 
concept to the defendant's activities and a refusal to apply the concept 
to his activities could be appropriately constrained and supported by 
interpersonally available reasons. In such actions, either a judgment 
of negligence or of nonnegligence would be objective, assuming the 
other specifications have been met. Which judgment is better will de-
pend on other criteria for evaluating legal judgments. In many negli-
gence actions, only a judgment of negligence or a judgment of 
nonnegligence will be appropriately constrained and supported by in-
terpersonally available reasons. In these, only one or the other judg-
ment will be objective.110 Note that, even in those cases in which 
109. Dworkin, who writes about objectivity in various ways in various places, claims that 
appellate court decisions in hard cases attain a certain kind of objectivity when they ascertain the 
one best answer in such cases. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 266-71. Tushnet some-
times argues that in all cases law is always radically indeterminate, and that therefore legal deci-
sion is never objective. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 99, at 804-27. 
110. Again, those absorbed by whether there is a single right or one best answer in hard legal 
cases or whether any legal case really has only a single answer have generally thought about these 
questions in the context of appellate judicial decisions. My own view is that the system of 
layered constraints implemented by common law methodology does in fact constrain the deci-
sions an appellate court may reach, thereby lending a degree of determinacy to appellate court 
judging. Karl Llewellyn, Duncan Kennedy, and Fred Schauer seem to hold something like this 
view. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 19-56 
(1960); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 167-96 (1991); Kennedy, supra note 5, 
at 527-28. Some of the debate over indeterminacy in law has focused on rule skepticism, some-
thing that blend objectivity does not address. For the rule-skeptic argument, see Tushnet, supra 
note 99, at 804-24. For powerful refutations of the significance of rule skepticism for law, see 
SCHAUER, supra, at 191-96; Frank I. Michelman, Politics as Medicine: On Misdiagnosing Legal 
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either a judgment of negligence or one of nonnegligence could be ob-
jective, there may be other grounds for preferring one judgment to the 
other, such as relative justness. 111 
I have tried to show how the blend conception serves to clarify 
ongoing debates within legal scholarship over the objectivity of legal 
judgments, allows for and motivates the politically oriented criticism 
that detractors of legal judgments want to make, and takes the sting 
out of what otherwise seems a thorny question regarding the objectiv-
ity of legal judgments. More generally, in the last Part of this essay, I 
have tried to show the power of the blend conception as a position in 
the scholarly arena, in addition to its power as a regulative ideal for 
practice. 
CONCLUSION 
Measured by the blend conception, different kinds of blend judg-
ments vary in their potential for objectivity. I have illustrated this by 
comparing judgments of negligence and judgments of what is speech. 
The same point holds when we compare judgments of negligence with 
judgments of rudeness or judgments of humor. Without extensively 
reviewing the way the latter judgments fall short of the specifications, 
we can still quickly see their comparative lack of objectivity. For in-
stance, few judgments of etiquette or humor are the topics of sustained 
dialogue. Few such judgments have interpersonal reasons regularly 
marshaled on their behalf. Likewise, convergence on such judgments 
tends to be more local and less durable than convergences related to 
judgments of negligence. 
As these examples suggest, the lack of objectivity in judgments of 
humor and judgments of etiquette owes to the informal ways in which 
we usually make them. We do not have institutionalized systems for 
generating such judgments, designed to promote dialogue, the mar-
shaling of interpersonal reasons, or convergence. In fact, to the extent 
we do institutionalize these judgments, such as through etiquette ex-
perts who publish their correspondences with readers, the resulting 
judgments come closer to achieving objectivity. The correspondence 
between Miss Manners and her readers creates a dialogue, in which 
Miss Manners's knowledge and expertise regarding the practice of eti-
quette constrain her readers while at the same time their real-world 
experiences constrain her interpretations of that practice. The process 
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1224, 1226-28 (1981); Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy 
Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). 
111. For a discussion of possible grounds, other than objectivity, for accepting blend judg-
ments, see infra text accompanying notes 112-15. 
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instantiates, to some degree, dialogical constraint. By and large, 
though, when it comes to most judgments of etiquette, no such process 
occurs. Moreover, this rarely matters. This view may surprise, com-
ing from someone who has been defending the idea of objectivity. But 
now that we have a better grip on what objectivity in blend judgment 
involves, we can see that objectivity may well be less important for 
some kinds of blend judgments than others. 
Objectivity does matter to blend legal judgments. Recall the rela-
tionship between objectivity and interpersonal validity. It is very im-
portant for legal judgments to have interpersonal validity. Sanctions 
go only so far in producing obedience to the law; in any event, purely 
fear-driven obedience is not what we seek. We want the law to be 
interpersonally valid in its own right. We do not want a government 
that must coerce and pressure citizens into obeying the law. 
Closely related to the issue of law's interpersonal validity is the 
issue of law's legitimacy. 112 Take the following as a basic working 
elucidation: a judgment is legitimate to the extent that it is based on 
appropriate grounds. 113 Legitimacy licenses the imposition of the 
judgment on dissidents; that is, if a judgment is legitimate it is appro-
priate to penalize those who dissent from it. 114 
In principle, it is possible that objectivity is sufficient to establish 
legitimacy: that the only ground necessary to license imposition of a 
judgment on dissidents is that the judgment be objective. In the case 
of legal judgments, however, objectivity is not sufficient. Their legiti-
macy requires at least one other feature: justness. A blend legal judg-
ment that fully meets the specifications for objectivity but is 
nevertheless thoroughly unjust wou1d be relatively illegitimate, 
although not completely so, in comparison to a blend legal judgment 
that is both objective and just. More strikingly, the reverse of this 
point also holds: a blend legal judgment that is just, but wholly lack-
ing in objectivity, is relatively illegitimate, although not completely so, 
in comparison to a blend legal judgment that is both just and objective. 
To understand the force of this point, imagine a corrupt jurisdiction in 
112. PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 4-12, 38-56, 95-100 (1984) (discussing the relation-
ship between legitimacy and obligation to obey the law). Legitimacy is a concept that merits at 
least as much attention as objectivity, but that is another project. 
113. Even this very thin working elucidation is sure to provoke negative reaction - that is 
why legitimacy deserves as much attention as objectivity. One question immediately surfaces: is 
legitimacy a matter of appropriate grounds or a matter of perceived appropriate grounds? This is 
a more particular version of a general question about legitimacy: whether it is a matter of accept-
ance or a matter of what ought to be accepted. My own preference, undefended here, is for the 
latter formulation. That is, I would distinguish between genuine legitimacy and felt legitimacy. 
In the text, I refer to genuine legitimacy. 
114. The appropriate degree of severity of the penalty is a further, separate question. 
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which a single judge makes judgments of negligence solely on the basis 
of how she is bribed. By coincidence, some of these judgments are 
just, on whatever theory of substantive justice you like. I do not think 
we would take these judgments to provide the same measure of license 
to force the losing party to go along as we would if the judgments were 
also objective - although arguably they provide a greater measure of 
license than those of the judge's judgments that are not even just. 
So objectivity grounds a blend legal judgment's legitimacy. As for 
other types of blend judgments, objectivity may play little role in sup-
porting their legitimacy or, more radically, legitimacy may matter lit-
tle to them. Both interpersonal authority and legitimacy seem quite 
beside the point for judgments of humor and less crucial for judgments 
of etiquette than judgments of law, no doubt due to the respective 
places of humor, etiquette, and law in our culture. If we relied on 
etiquette (or humor?) to perform the complex, extensive regulatory 
functions we now assign to law, we would want judgments of etiquette 
to be interpersonally authoritative and expect them to be legitimate. 
But our culture, unlike some others, turns to law. So we need our 
blend legal judgments to be objective far more than we need objectivity 
from our blend judgments of etiquette.11s 
It is good that we do not always need objectivity from all of our 
blend judgments. Objectivity is costly. In financial terms alone, it is 
quite expensive. The blend conception of objectivity need not be im-
plemented in the form of common law methodology, but any imple-
mentation is likely to be financially draining. Creating systematic 
opportunities and mechanisms for constraint, dialogue, convergence, 
the formation of interpersonal reasons, and so on requires monetary 
might. Consider the financial expense of the common law system -
do not forget the expenses of educating attorneys, financing law 
schools, and collecting and publishing judicial opinions. Money spent 
on implementing blend objectivity is money not spent elsewhere. The 
same is true of human resources not best understood financially. 
Something like the common law system takes a lot of talented man-
power. Putting this talent and hard work into that system exacts an 
opportunity cost - fewer human resources for other endeavors. 
The method for achieving objectivity upon which I have focused is 
115. For us, the other domain upon which we rely seriously to regulate interpersonal rela-
tions and activities is ethics. I have not used ethical blend judgments as a comparison class to 
blend legal judgments because they are, in some ways, too similar. To the extent that one of their 
similarities consists in similarity of regulatory function, we need objectivity in ethical judgments 
as much as we need objectivity in legal judgments. But, as I discuss in the text below, creating 
objectivity is costly, in a number of respects. Before we insist upon objectivity in ethical judg-
ment, we need to decide whether we can - or want to - afford it at its price. 
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the common law system of adjudication, in part because we aspire to 
objectivity in our common law judgments. Denunciations of law's ob-
jectivity sting. This evidences our desire and need for a fairly high 
degree of objectivity in blend legal judgments. If objectivity did not 
matter in the legal context, we would simply shrug off the critiques. 
As it is, we can recast the critiques as illuminations of when, where, 
and how legal judgments fall short of the regulative ideal provided by 
the blend conception of objectivity, even as we deny the persuasiveness 
of the critiques as attacks on the ideal itself. Moreover, we can insist 
that our legal judgments more closely satisfy the ideal. 
